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Abstract
This dissertation provides robust, quantitative models in healthcare finance to aid
decision-makers with rigorous, analytical tools that capture high complexity and
high uncertainty of problem. The first chapter investigates the impact of parameter
uncertainty on risk scoring, and presents an approach to obtain robust risk scores to
address uncertainty in risk adjustment, which is used to quantify payment transfers
across health plans under the Affordable Care Act. We provide a tractable method-
ology to incorporate uncertainty in the risk factor weights via linear programming
to improve risk adjustment among payers and discuss the impact of uncertainty on
the risk scores. In the second chapter, we provide an analytical methodology to help
individuals narrow down plan choices in the Health Insurance Exchanges (HIX) by
identifying plans that are dominated by competitors’ offerings in terms of premium,
metal level, maximum out of pocket payment and plan type. We further quantify
the amount by which the premium of a dominated plan should be reduced to make
it competitive in our framework. This part of our work provides important quan-
titative tools to guide the discussions between payers and policy-makers regarding
HIX. Our approach also provides payers with a novel way to analyze their own plans
in the HIX landscape. The third chapter identifies the key factors that drive en-
rollment rates of the two major types of Medicare Part D prescription drug plans:
MAPD and PDP, to assist policy makers in better promoting their plans to Medi-
1
care beneficiaries. The fourth chapter investigates trends in physician services usage
and Medicare reimbursement rate from CMS public files. We analyze the HCPCS
(Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System) codes and investigate the validity
of the concern that doctors tend to upcode on purpose for more reimbursement. We
also utilize time series analysis to predict Medicare spending in ten years. In the last
chapter, we survey and propose robust optimization models in healthcare systems
engineering, particularly in the applications of healthcare costs prediction, disease
management, IMRT fluence map optimization, and operating room planning, among
others.
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Chapter 1
Contributions
The health care system in the United States is complex and health care costs are
growing at unsustainable rates. In 2013, U.S. health care spending reached $2.9
trillion, an average of $9,255 per person. It accounted for 17.4 percent of GDP of
that year. Although the United States has the most expensive health care system in
the world, the Commonwealth Fund [30] ranked the United States last in the quality
of health care among seven developed countries - Australia, Canada, Germany, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom - on measures of health system
performance in five areas: quality, efficiency, access to care, equity and the ability
to lead long, healthy, productive lives. In order to improve the health care system,
President Obama signed comprehensive health reform, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, into law on March 23, 2010. The ultimate goals of healthcare
reform are to expand coverage, control health care costs, and improve health care
delivery system. However, according to preliminary data released on April 30 by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, total health care spending during the first quarter
of 2014 increased by 9.9% to $43.3 billion and contributed 1.1 percentage points
to growth in the total gross domestic product. The purpose of this dissertation is
3
to provide robust, quantitative models in healthcare finance to aid decision-makers
with rigorous, analytical tools that capture high complexity and high uncertainty of
problem. The contributions of each chapter are as follows.
We investigate healthcare financing systems from five different perspectives: risk
adjustment under uncertainty to help payers be properly compensated for the health
status of their enrollees, the efficiency of health insurance plans offered on public ex-
changes to help customers get the most value out of their money, Medicare enrollees’
choice regarding Medicare Advantage and stand-alone prescription drug plans to en-
sure long-term affordability of prescription drugs for an aging population, the trends
in physician services usage for the Medicare population and Medicare reimbursement
rates, and the use of robust optimization techniques to protect decision-makers under
uncertainty in a wide range of health systems engineering settings.
Regarding risk adjustment under uncertainty, our contributions are: (1) We dis-
cuss the impact of parameter uncertainty on risk scoring and risk adjustment; (2)
We present a highly tractable approach to create robust risk scores to incorporate
ambiguity and uncertainty in risk adjustment model. The highly tractable approach
is based on solving linear programming problems; (3) We provide empirical results
on the impact of robust risk scoring on actual money transfer for insurers.
Regarding the efficiency of health insurance plans on HIX, our contributions are:
(1) We investigate the main drivers of plan premiums in the health exchanges, with
examples drawn from the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts health insurance mar-
ketplaces; (2) We propose a simple algorithm based on linear regression to identify
inefficient (dominated) plans in the exchanges based on plans’ attributes, and to
assign letter grades to payers; (3) We identify the excess premium by which certain
plans are less competitive than others based on an analysis of plans’ features such
4
as premiums and deductibles.
On Medicare beneficiaries’ choice between Medicare Advantage and stand-alone
prescription drug plans, our contributions are: (1) We provide an overview of the
major two types of Medicare Part D prescription drug plans: Medicare Advantage
prescription plans (MAPDs), and stand-alone prescription plans (PDPs); (2) We
identify the key factors that drive enrollment rates of MAPDs and PDPs in all
counties in the United States using beta regression, and discuss the differences in
factors driving MAPD and PDP enrollment; (3) We make recommendations to assist
policy makers in better promoting their plans to Medicare beneficiaries.
On the trends in physician services usage for the Medicare population and Medi-
care reimbursement rates, our contributions are: (1) We investigate trends in physi-
cian services usage and Medicare reimbursement rate from CMS public files; (2)
We analyze the HCPCS (Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System) codes and
investigate the validity of the concern that doctors tend to upcode on purpose to
get more reimbursement; (3) We utilize time series analysis and linear regression to
predict Pennsylvania’s Medicare spending in ten years.
On the applications of robust optimization techniques to protect decision-makers
under uncertainty in a wide range of health systems engineering settings, our con-
tributions are: (1) We provide an overview of the healthcare systems, including
payment systems and delivery systems, in the United States; (2) We survey and pro-
pose robust optimization models in healthcare systems engineering, particularly in
the applications of healthcare costs prediction, disease management, IMRT fluence
map optimization, and operating room planning, among others.
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Chapter 2
Robust Risk Adjustment in Health
Insurance
2.1 Introduction
Risk adjustment is defined in the Specifications Manual for National Hospital Quality
Measures as “a statistical process used to identify and adjust for variation in patient
outcomes that stem from differences in patient characteristics (or risk factors) across
health care organizations.” [77] The goal of risk adjustment is to reflect that “patients
may experience different outcomes regardless of the quality of care provided by the
health care organization” due to patient-specific characteristics, such as age or clinical
diagnoses [77]. Without appropriate risk adjustment, comparing patient outcomes
across organizations can be misleading. For instance, a best-in-class health provider
may attract particularly ill patients, who may face dire prognoses and thus may
have worse outcomes than patients who are only moderately ill and go to a less-
skilled provider. By accounting for existing risk factors, risk adjustment facilitates
6
a more fair and accurate inter-organizational comparison. The broad concepts and
applications of risk adjustment are presented in Ellis [35].
Risk adjustment is further defined by the American Academy of Actuaries as
“an actuarial tool used to calibrate payments to health plans or other stakeholders
based on the relative health of the at-risk populations.” [1] In that context, it ex-
tends beyond risk measurement into risk mitigation, and helps ensure that health
plans are appropriately compensated for the risks they enroll. Risk adjustment is a
permanent “zero-sum game” in that the total amounts paid by health plans into the
risk adjustment pool are received by other health plans each year. The goal of this
program is to stabilize a competitive marketplace in which health plans compete on
plan features and services rather than on avoidance of high risk individuals. This is
beneficial to consumers, particularly those with high-cost health conditions, as it is
more likely to give them continued choice of health plans. Specifically, risk adjust-
ment – when done well – can help remove the incentive for health plans to try not to
enroll sicker people (aka adverse selection), since they will be compensated for those
patients’ worse health status. Adverse selection can lead to three classes of ineffi-
ciencies: prices to participants do not reflect marginal costs, hence on a benefit-cost
basis individuals select the wrong health plans; desirable risk spreading is lost; and
health plans manipulate their offerings to deter the sick and attract the healthy [29].
Since insurers set premiums based on the riskiness of the people they enroll, adverse
selection would also lead to higher premiums and government spending [17]. Glaz-
er et. al. [50] develop a statistical methodology to improve upon adverse selection
outcome in design of risk adjustment formula in health insurance markets, where
enrollees sort between plans with fixed benefit offerings as a function of the plans’
premiums. McWilliams et. al. [61] show using a regression model that the implemen-
tation of the Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCC) model was associated with
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reduced favorable selection in the Medicare Advantage program. However, they also
point out that inadequate risk adjustment would probably cause greater instability
in exchange markets than in Medicare Advantage, and lead to competition among
exchange plans to attract and retain healthy enrollees, as well as the withdrawal of
undercompensated plans. In contrast, Brown et. al. [19] demonstrate that the effect
of risk adjustment on government’s cost of providing health insurance is imperfect
since risk adjustment can potentially increase the scope for selecting individuals with
costs below their capitation payment due to the increase in the variance of medical
costs with the risk score.
The Health and Human Services (HHS) official federal risk adjustment models are
available in the HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2014, which was
first released as a proposed rule at the end of 2012 [75]. The HHS risk adjustment
system uses fifteen weighted least squares regression models: platinum, gold, silver,
bronze, and catastrophic for adult, child, and infant, respectively, to compute risk
scores. The weight is the fraction of the year enrolled. Each HHS risk adjustment
model predicts annual plan liability for an enrollee based on the person’s age, gender,
and diagnoses. The risk score of each enrollee is equal to the sum of all the risk
weights associated with that patient, with the average risk score over the whole
population being scaled to 1.
The enrollment-weighted average risk score of all enrollees in a particular health
plan within a geographic rating area (the weights being again the fractions of the
year enrolled) are then used as input to the payment transfer formula to determine
an issuer’s payment or charge for a particular plan, which is a baseline payment
times the plan’s enrollment-weighted average risk score [5]. The HHS risk adjust-
ment model is a concurrent model, where diagnoses from a given period are used
to predict cost in the same period. In contrast, a prospective model uses data from
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a prior period to predict costs in the current period or in the future. By design,
both acute and chronic illnesses are emphasized in the concurrent model. In the
prospective model, systematic factors, such as aging and chronic illnesses, outweigh
acute and one-time conditions [2]. Acute and one-time events are averaged at the
age/gender group level in the prospective model (Yi et. al. [91]). The concurrent
model is used by HHS because it is more robust to changes in enrollment than the
prospective model ( [91], [87]). This is particularly useful under the Affordable Care
Act since newly enrolled individuals may not have prior claims data. In addition,
prescription drugs are not included as a predictor in each HHS risk adjustment mod-
el. To evaluate model performance, R2 and predictive ratios are examined, where the
R2 statistic calculates the percentage of individual variation explained by a model,
and the predictive ratio is the ratio of the weighted-mean predicted plan liability
for the model sample population to the weighted-mean actual plan liability for the
model sample population [91].
Winkelman [88] uses the Mean Absolute Prediction Error (MAPE) as an alter-
native to measure predictive accuracy, where MAPE is calculated by dividing the
sum of absolute errors by the sample size. Glazer and McGuire [49] argue that, in
order to address adverse selection and asymmetric information in managed care, risk
adjustment should be viewed as a way to set prices for different individuals. They
argue for instance that the payment weight on a patient’s age “may be chosen for its
incentive properties and need not – indeed should not – be the same as the coefficient
on age from a regression explaining average costs.” Weiner et. al. [84] quantify the
impact of biased selection on health plans in the exchange and evaluates mitigation
attempts included in the Affordable Care Act of 2010.
Proper risk adjustment is thus very important for payers’ long-term financial vi-
ability and for the competitiveness of the health insurance market. Risk adjustment
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has been used in the Medicare Advantage (MA) program, the Part D prescription
drug program, many state Medicaid programs, the Commonwealth Care program in
Massachusetts, and some employer-based plans [1]. Risk adjustment for commer-
cial insurance arrived in 2014 for the individual and small-group marketplaces. The
main difference between CMS-HCC model for Medicare and HHS-HCC model for
commercial insurance is that insurers get payments from CMS directly under Medi-
care, while payments are between insurers under commercial risk adjustment. The
HHS methodology was applied to all non-grandfathered plans in all states except
Massachusetts both inside and outside of the marketplaces. The risk weights can be
obtained by linear regression, probit regression, or logistic regression, depending on
the situation considered; however, estimates of regression coefficients are subject to
error. Because risk adjustment in this context involves real money transfers between
payers, it is important to develop quantitative methods to incorporate ambiguity
and uncertainty in the risk weights. The main contribution of this chapter is to
present a tractable methodology to create robust risk scores, which determine the
amount of money to transfer. While we propose another way to investigate and in-
corporate impact of uncertainty, out methodology serves as a supplement to current
implementation of HHS-HCC model and leads to fair payments when uncertainty
exists.
2.2 Calculation of Risk Adjustment in Healthcare
Risk adjustment is typically done by computing risk scores for each enrollee and
assigning to each health plan an amount of money equal to a baseline payment
weighted by the aggregate risk score for the population it covers [5]. This is because
risk scores are computed such that their average is 1. While a risk score attempts to
10
quantify how “costly” an enrollee will be to a plan in the future, a precise measure
requires to specify what information will be used in making that determination:
concurrent weights emphasize acute conditions, while prospective weights focus on
chronic ones [2]. An example of risk score calculation from the Health Affairs Issue
Brief is as follows:
Table 2.1: Example of risk score of a patient
Risk Factor Risk Weight
Male age 32 0.22
Diabetes w/ significant comorbidities 1.32
Asthma 0.96
Low-cost dermatology 0.30
Total 2.80
In this example, this particular individual has 4 risk factors including 1 demo-
graphic factor and 3 diagnosis factors. Different risk weights are assigned to the
factors. A higher risk weight means potential higher chance of incurring healthcare
cost. By summing up all risk weights, the risk score for this individual is 2.8. The risk
score means that this individual is expected to have healthcare costs 2.80 times high-
er than population average. To get the dollar amount of this individual’s healthcare
costs, we can simply multiply his total risk score by the population average cost. In
addition, the average risk score for a health plan can be calculated as the arithmetic
mean of risk scores of all enrollees in the plan.
2.3 Robustness in Risk Adjustment Models
An example to show the need for robustness is based on the Hospital Value-Based
Purchasing (VBP) program, established by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) [74]. It aims at realigning hospitals’ financial incentives by reward-
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ing those that provide highest-quality care, with quality of care being quantified as
the weighted sum of three sets of measures: process measures (13 measures), patient
satisfaction measures (8 measures) and mortality rates for heart attacks, heart fail-
ures and pneumonia within 30 days of a patient’s leaving the hospital [65]. CMS
funds the VBP adjustment scheme by withholding 1% of each hospital’s Medicare
payments, and re-distributing this pool of money to the hospitals based on the ad-
justment factors. Hospitals with the lowest adjustment factors receive little to no
money back, and thus their 1% of Medicare payments will be lost to them and reas-
signed to better performing hospitals. Hospitals with the highest adjustment factors
receive payments exceeding their initial 1% contribution to the pool. 1% might be
ignored by bigger hospitals, but it can have a significant impact on smaller hospi-
tals or hospitals in precarious financial health. Moody’s estimates the preliminary
median operating margins for non-profit hospitals in FY 2013 to be at 2.2%, a de-
crease compared to FY 2012 [78]. The significance of the impact of 1% can also be
illustrated by the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, in which penalties are
collected from the hospitals through a percentage reduction in their base Medicare
inpatient claims payments, up to a cap. The cap was 1% in fiscal year 2013, when
the aggregate amount of penalties was about $280 million against 2217 hospitals.
CMS first issued proxy factors in August 2012 and the actual adjustment factors
for these 2,985 hospitals were published by CMS in December 2012, both of which are
provided in Table 16 of the FY 2013 Final Rule Tables [76]. The proxy adjustment
factors were calculated using historical baseline and performance periods, and would
not actually be used to adjust hospital payments. We investigate the variability
between proxy and actual scores as follows. We first compute the rank of each
hospital, based on the rank of its adjustment factor, with the hospital having the
highest (best) adjustment factor receiving rank 1. We then merge the records under
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both the proxy and actual systems to compare proxy and actual ranks, as shown in
table 2.7. Ranks matter since the program is based on relative performance.
Table 2.2: Proxy vs. Actual VBP Adjustment Factors and Ranks (FY2013)
Proxy Adj. Factor Actual Adj. Factor Proxy Rank Actual Rank
1.0072129779 0.9949792372 21 2887
1.0017818865 0.9920251756 799 2981
1.0035728881 0.9938951967 347 2938
1.0039407695 0.9946071725 282 2915
1.0042747671 0.9958366705 225 2811
The difference in rank is then computed as the proxy rank minus the actual rank,
such that a positive difference represents a gain in ranks following the publication
of the final (actual) factors. Figure 2.1 shows the differences in ranks from most
negative to most positive. Because the total number of hospitals is approximately
3,000, hospitals at the extreme left of the graph represent hospitals that had been
expected to perform at the top based on proxy numbers and found themselves at the
bottom when the actual numbers were published. Similarly, hospitals at the extreme
right represent hospitals that had been deemed at the bottom based on the proxy
factors and came out on top with the actual factors. The wide fluctuation between
the proxy factors and the actual ones has, to the best of our knowledge, not been
discussed in the press or elsewhere. The worst rank loss is a drop of 2,866 spots – from
rank 21 to rank 2,887 – by the Meadowview Regional Medical Center in Maysville,
KY. The highest gain in rank – from rank 2,659 to rank 144 – is an increase of 2,515 by
Loretto Hospital in Chicago, IL. 335 hospitals or 11.81% of the hospitals considered
lost 1,000 spots or more and 250 hospitals or 8.81% gained 1,000 or more. The same
pattern follows for fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015. Although proxy adjustment
factors are not used for payment purpose, they could be used by hospitals in their
marketing strategies to negotiate with insurers or attract/maintain customers. The
large fluctuations would force them to change strategies after the actual adjustment
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factors are revealed. Some may argue there is possibility that it is due to changes in
provider quality. However, such large fluctuations over a large percentage of hospitals
within a few months’ time risk casting doubt on the meaningfulness of the factors
and slowing down efforts to move to value-based models, and suggests there is a need
to “robustify” factors.
Figure 2.1: Difference in Rank
2.4 Risk Adjustment without Uncertainty
Suppose in the current health insurance market, there are 3 insurers and 1000 pa-
tients, each insurer having 1/3 of the patients. We only consider 32 risk factors,
including 6 diagnosis factors and 26 demographic factors (age & gender), with risk
weights given by the Federal Register Volume 77 Issue 236 (Platinum Plan). The 6
diagnosis factors include chronic diseases such as Asthma, Diabetes, Heart Failure,
HIV and Mental Illness, and acute disease Acute Appendicitis. The 26 demograph-
ic factors cover individuals aging from 2 to 64. “Made-up” binary parameters for
diagnoses and demographics are randomly given to each enrollee.
The traditional risk adjustment process, if the weights of the risk factors are
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known exactly, is as follows:
1. Compute the risk score for each enrollee and scale it such that the average
population risk score is one,
2. Compute the average risk score for each insurer (weighted by the fraction of
the year each enrollee has been on the plan),
3. Determine the transfer payment as the difference between the insurer’s cost
(sum of patients’ risk score times nominal cost) and his revenue (number of
patients times capitated payment).
Applying this process to the data we generated, the risk scores of the three
insurers would be 0.9861, 1.0190 and 0.9949, respectively. By multiplying the risk
scores by the non-adjusted base payment of $500, the transfer payments for each
insurer would be -$2,321, $3,163 and -$849, respectively. The sum of all transfer
payments are always zero. In this particular example, both insurer 1 and insurer
3 give money, while insurer 2 receives “a lot” of money. However, the impacts on
insurer 1 and 3 are quite different since insurer 1 gives “a lot” of money, whereas
insurer 3 only gives “a little” money.
In this situation, we assume true values of coefficients are known, which is usually
not the case in the real world. Next section we will introduce the situation where
uncertainty is being taken into consideration.
2.5 Risk Adjustment with Uncertainty
Suppose risk weights are subject to relative uncertainty with mean 0 and standard
deviation 30%. They are truncated to zero if sign changes because risk weights
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cannot be negative. We perform 100,000 simulations in MATLAB to quantify the
uncertainty. Resulting transfer payments are interpreted as what insurers should
have given/received if they had known the true values of the risk weights. Figure 2.2
shows the distribution of transfer payments based on simulation results.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of transfer payments
The distribution of the dataset shows clearly that insurer 1 mostly gives, insurer 2
mostly receives, and insurer 3 is in the middle. Having an idea what the distribution
would be like, we look at some basic statistics of the insurers’ risk scores from the
simulation results.
Table 2.3: Basic Statistics of risk scores
Insurer 1 Insurer 2 Insurer 3
Expected 0.9870 1.0224 0.9907
St Deviation 0.0217 0.0216 0.0241
Minimum 0.8938 0.9466 0.8695
Maximum 1.1460 1.1577 1.0549
We notice that only insurer 2 has risk score higher than 1, meaning only insurer
2 receives money because it enrolls sicker individuals. The ranking statistics (small-
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est/middle/largest risk score) also indicates this conclusion since the probability that
insurer 2 will get money is 87.58%.
Table 2.4: Ranking Statistics of risk scores
Insurer 1 Insurer 2 Insurer 3
Smallest 56.71% 4.91% 38.38%
Middle 31.46% 26.35% 42.19%
Largest 11.83% 68.74% 19.43%
Prob Transfer>0 24.52% 87.58% 39.53%
In addition, we can have the 95% range forecasts for each insurer based on the
basic statistics:
Table 2.5: Lower bound and upper bound of risk scores
Insurer 1 Insurer 2 Insurer 3
Lower Bound 0.9445 0.9801 0.9435
Expected 0.9870 1.0224 0.9907
Upper Bound 1.0295 1.0647 1.0379
Using the expected risk scores, transfer payments in traditional model would be
-$2,171, $3,730 and -$1549. However, here the lower bounds and upper bounds of risk
scores are not scaled. We scale them to average 1, with loss of the 95% confidence
level. Table 2.7 shows the new lower bounds and upper bounds.
Table 2.6: Scaled lower bound and upper bound of risk scores
Insurer 1 Insurer 2 Insurer 3
“Lower Bound” 0.9879 1.0252 0.9869
“Upper Bound” 0.9861 1.0198 0.9941
Now we obtain scenarios for possible risk scores by creating range forecasts instead
of point forecasts for risk scores, with additional constraint that their average is 1:
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Table 2.7: Scaled range forecasts of risk scores
Insurer 1 Insurer 2 Insurer 3
Range [0.9861,0.9879] [1.0198,1.0252] [0.9869,0.9941]
However, this method has some drawbacks. First, these forecasts are obtained
by simulation, while we do not know which distribution we should use to simulate
the coefficients. Second, scenarios and ranges are obtained by making distributional
assumptions (Gaussian distribution) that are hard to check. Third, given ranges,
we don’t yet know how to transfer money. Therefore, we present a methodology to
create robust risk scores to address these issues in the next section.
2.6 Robust Risk Scoring
When the weights for the risk factors are not known precisely but estimates (for
instance from a regression) and confidence intervals are available, we face the question
of how this uncertainty should be incorporated so that payers receive a “fair” transfer
payment. We will seek to minimize the worst-case regret. Here the worst-case regret
is the greatest difference in absolute value between the estimated and actual risk
scores computed over all payers and all possible weights for the risk factors within
a predefined uncertainty set. It measures the worst-case difference in absolute value
between the money transfer that should have taken place between payers if the true
weights had been known and the transfer that actually did, based on the actual
weights used to compute the risk scores. These weights are the decision variables of
the problem.
We will use the following notation:
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K: the number of payers in the market,
Sk: the set of enrollees of insurer k = 1, . . . , K,
J : the set of conditions incorporated in risk scoring,
njk: the number of enrollees of insurer k = 1, . . . , K who have condition j ∈ J ,
Nk: the number of enrollees of plan k,
cij: a binary parameter equal to 1 when individual i (i ∈ Sk, k = 1, . . . , K)
has condition j,
wj: the incremental risk weight for condition j ∈ J
(to be added to the risk score of individual i if cij = 1).
Insurer k’s risk score before scaling is obtained by taking the average, over all
enrollees, of the risk weights of the factors that affect the enrollee.
1
Nk
∑
i∈Sk
∑
j∈J
wjcij =
1
Nk
∑
j∈J
wjnjk.
For convenience, we assume that all enrollees have been with the payer the whole year.
Adapting the formulation to the case where some patients have joined the health plan
during the year involves replacing the average over enrollees by a weighted average
where the weights are the fractions of year for each patient. This leads to modified
definitions for njk and Nk. Specifically, if τik is the fraction of the year individual i
has spent with insurer k, njk becomes
∑
i∈Sk
τikcij and Nk becomes
∑
i∈Sk
τik. Once the
njk and Nk have been thus updated, the models presented below apply immediately.
Risk scores are then scaled so that their population average is 1. Insurer k’s
average risk score after scaling becomes:
RSk =
∑
j∈J wjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J wjnjl
·
∑
l∈K Nl
Nk
.
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We model the uncertain coefficients wj, j ∈ J , as belonging to a polyhedral set
W . The set W can for instance be a box consisting of confidence intervals for each
(independent) factor, or possibly include a budget-of-uncertainty constraint in the
spirit of Bertsimas and Sim [14] to bound from above the total number of parameters
that can take their worst-case value. The problem we aim to solve in the decision
variables v (the weights we want to give to each factor within the feasible set W ) is
then:
min
v∈W
max
k∈K
max
w∈W
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈J vjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J vjnjl
∑
l∈K Nl
Nk
−
∑
j∈J wjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J wjnjl
∑
l∈K Nl
Nk
∣∣∣∣∣ (2.1)
Let assume w.l.o.g. that the polyhedral set W is represented as {w | l ≤ w ≤ u, Aw =
b}. Further, let N be the (njk) matrix, let e be the vector of all ones and let S be the
polyhedral set defined as: {(x, y) | ly ≤ x ≤ uy, Ax = b y, e′N ′x = 1}. In order to
derive a tractable reformulation to Problem (2.1), we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. For all k ∈ K, the fractional optimization problems:
(FP−k) : min
w∈W
∑
j∈J wjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J wjnjl
,
and
(FP+k) : max
w∈W
∑
j∈J wjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J wjnjl
.
can be solved efficiently by solving the linear programming problems:
(LP−k) : min
(x,y)∈S
∑
j∈J
njkxj,
and
(LP+k) : max
(x,y)∈S
∑
j∈J
njkxj,
respectively.
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Proof. The proof is in two steps.
(i) For any w ∈ W , let xj = wj∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J wjnjl
for all j and y =
1∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J wjnjl
.
(Recall that y is always positive because the risk weights and the counts are always
positive). Then it is immediate that (x, y) is in the set S defined above and we have:∑
j∈J wjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J wjnjl
∑
l∈K Nl
Nk
=
∑
l∈K Nl
Nk
·
∑
j∈J
njkxj.
(ii) For any (x, y) ∈ S, we must have y > 0 since y = 0 would lead to x = 0 (due to
ly ≤ x ≤ uy), which would be infeasible (due to e′N ′x = 1). Let then wj = xj
y
for all
j. Then it is immediate that w is in the set W defined above and the two objectives
are equal again.
Therefore, Problem (FP−k) is equivalent to (LP−k) and Problem (FP+k) is equiv-
alent to (LP+k) for all k.
Let u−k be the optimal objective of the linear optimization problem (LP−k) and
u+k be the optimal objective of the linear optimization problem (LP+k) for all k. It
follows from Lemma 2.1 that we have for all k:
u−k = min
w∈W
∑
j∈J wjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J wjnjl
, (2.2)
and
u+k = max
w∈W
∑
j∈J wjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J wjnjl
. (2.3)
The key result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Robust risk scoring). Problem (2.1) is equivalent to the following
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linear programming problem:
min Z
s.t. Z ≥
∑
l∈K Nl
Nk
(∑
j∈J
njkxj − u−k
)
∀k
Z ≥
∑
l∈K Nl
Nk
(
u+k −
∑
j∈J
njkxj
)
∀k
(x, y) ∈ S.
Proof. We rewrite Problem (2.1) as:
min Z
s.t. Z ≥
∑
l∈K Nl
Nk
( ∑
j∈J vjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J vjnjl
−
∑
j∈J wjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J wjnjl
)
, ∀k,∀w ∈ W,
Z ≥
∑
l∈K Nl
Nk
(
−
∑
j∈J vjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J vjnjl
+
∑
j∈J wjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J wjnjl
)
, ∀k,∀w ∈ W,
v ∈ W,
or equivalently:
min Z
s.t. Z ≥
∑
l∈K Nl
Nk
( ∑
j∈J vjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J vjnjl
− min
w∈W
∑
j∈J wjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J wjnjl
)
, ∀k,
Z ≥
∑
l∈K Nl
Nk
(
−
∑
j∈J vjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J vjnjl
+ max
w∈W
∑
j∈J wjnjk∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J wjnjl
)
, ∀k,
v ∈ W.
We inject Eqs. (2.2) and (2.3) and use the transformation xj =
vj∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J vjnjl
and y =
1∑
l∈K
∑
j∈J vjnjl
. The rest of the proof is identical to the proof of Lemma
2.1, replacing w by v, and is omitted here.
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2.7 Numerical Experiments and Discussions
To test our approach, we generate a sample with 1,000,000 patients and 10 payers.
The base payment is $2,000. The risk factors and nominal weights are taken from
the Federal Register [75]. The standard error and confidence interval of each risk
weight should be available by CMS as they run the regression models. For illustrative
purposes, the confidence interval of each risk weight is symmetric, centered at the
nominal weight, and with a relative deviation from the mean selected randomly and
up to 30% (i.e., the upper bound is at most 1.3 times the nominal weight.) The
uncertainty set is a hypercube or “box” consisting of the range forecasts for each
weight. Table 2.8 shows the nominal and robust weights as well as the lower and
upper bounds of the weights used in the model. Table 2.9 compares nominal and
robust risk scores for each insurer.
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Table 2.8: Nominal Weights vs. Robust Weights
Risk Factor Nominal weight Deviation (%) Lower bound Upper bound Robust weight Change
Male,21-24 0.258 24.44 0.1949 0.3211 0.1949 -
Male,25-29 0.278 27.17 0.2025 0.3535 0.3533 -/- -
Male,30-34 0.338 3.81 0.3251 0.3509 0.3509 ++
Male,35-39 0.413 27.40 0.2998 0.5262 0.2998 - -
Male,40-44 0.487 18.97 0.3946 0.5794 0.3946 - -
Male,45-49 0.581 2.93 0.5640 0.5980 0.5641 -/- -
Male,50-54 0.737 8.35 0.6754 0.7986 0.7986 ++
Male,55-59 0.863 16.41 0.7214 1.0046 0.7214 - -
Male,60-64 1.028 28.73 0.7327 1.3233 1.1182 +
Female,21-24 0.433 28.95 0.3077 0.5583 0.5243 +
Female,25-29 0.548 4.73 0.5221 0.5739 0.5221 - -
Female,30-34 0.656 29.12 0.4650 0.8470 0.8470 ++
Female,35-39 0.76 28.72 0.5418 0.9782 0.9782 ++
Female,40-44 0.839 14.56 0.7168 0.9612 0.7168 - -
Female,45-49 0.878 24.01 0.6672 1.0888 0.6704 -/- -
Female,50-54 1.013 4.26 0.9699 1.0561 1.0561 ++
Female,55-59 1.054 12.65 0.9206 1.1874 1.1874 ++
Female,60-64 1.156 27.47 0.8384 1.4736 0.9859 -
Male, 2-4 0.283 23.77 0.2157 0.3503 0.3503 ++
Male, 5-9 0.196 28.78 0.1396 0.2524 0.2524 ++
Male, 10-14 0.246 19.67 0.1976 0.2944 0.2942 +/++
Male, 15-20 0.336 1.07 0.3324 0.3396 0.3396 ++
Female, 2-4 0.233 25.47 0.1736 0.2924 0.2151 -
Female, 5-9 0.165 28.02 0.1188 0.2112 0.1188 - -
Female, 10-14 0.223 20.36 0.1776 0.2684 0.2105 -
Female, 15-20 0.379 22.73 0.2928 0.4652 0.3604 -
Asthma 1.098 22.29 0.8532 1.3428 1.0851 -
Acute Appendicitis 0.3 11.77 0.2647 0.3353 0.2656 -/- -
Diabetes 1.331 19.66 1.0693 1.5927 1.0693 - -
Congestive Heart Failure 3.79 5.14 3.5954 3.9846 3.9846 ++
HIV 5.485 21.18 4.3232 6.6468 4.8978 -
Mental Illness 1.5 0.95 1.4857 1.5143 1.4857 - -
The codes for column “Change” are: (1) “-”: robust weight is smaller than
nominal weight; (2) “- -”: robust weight reaches the lower bound; (3) “-/- -”: robust
weight is very close to lower bound, due to numerical issues; (4) “+”: robust weight
is larger than nominal weight; (5) “++”: robust weight reaches the upper bound;
(6) “+/++”: robust weight is very close to lower bound, due to numerical issues.
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Table 2.9: Nominal risk scores vs. Robust risk scores
Insurer 1 Insurer 2 Insurer 3 Insurer 4 Insurer 5
Nominal Risk Score 0.9990379 0.9993510 1.0005282 1.0008137 0.9995409
Robust Risk Score 0.9990487 0.9992846 1.0004502 1.0007771 0.9995645
Change in Risk Score 0.0011% -0.0066% -0.0078% -0.0037% 0.0024%
Nominal money transfer -192413.36 -129803.99 105639.84 162732.18 -91822.65
Robust money transfer -190265.94 -143077.69 90036.45 155424.44 -87108.02
Change in money transfer -1.1160% 10.2260% -14.7704% -4.4907% -5.1345%
Insurer 6 Insurer 7 Insurer 8 Insurer 9 Insurer 10
Nominal Risk Score 1.0007512 1.0007304 1.0003757 1.0000186 0.9988525
Robust Risk Score 1.0007750 1.0006677 1.0004926 1.0000597 0.9988801
Change in Risk Score 0.0024% -0.0063% 0.0117% 0.0041% 0.0028%
Nominal money transfer 150238.92 146073.36 75135.25 3714.90 -229494.45
Robust money transfer 154993.01 133534.91 98516.48 11931.70 -223985.34
Change in money transfer 3.1644% -8.5837% 31.1189% 221.1848% -2.4005%
We can see from Table 2.9 that although the percentage changes in risk scores are
small, the changes in actual money transfers are significant. The reason is that the
relative change in risk score is calculated as
RS −RSN
RSN
, while the relative change in
actual money transfer is calculated as
(RS − 1)×N × C − (RSN − 1)×N × C
(RSN − 1)×N × C , or
equivalently
RS −RSN
RSN − 1 : the numerator stays the same but the denominator is not
and this can create significant changes because the risk scores are close to 1 to begin
with. Note that RS, RSN , N , and C denote robust risk score, nominal risk score,
number of enrollees in the plan, and capitation payment per person, respectively.
In the example above, 4 out of 10 payers observe a relative change in actual money
transfer higher than 10%.
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have investigated how to mitigate the impact of parameter un-
certainty on risk scoring in healthcare. An example related to hospital ranking using
adjustment factors was provided to demonstrate the need for robustness. We pre-
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sented an approach to compute robust risk scores. Our methodology involves solving
a series of linear programming problems and thus is highly tractable. Future work
includes using budget uncertainty and addressing uncertainty related to the health
status of previously uninsured customers entering the system due to the Affordable
Care Act of 2010.
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Chapter 3
Plan Efficiency Evaluation in
Health Insurance Exchanges
3.1 Introduction
The establishment of the Health Insurance Marketplace through the Affordable Care
Act has opened an important channel for individuals to obtain health coverage [3].
It allows individuals to compare different health plans and shop health insurance
on a web-based portal. The exchanges are created and regulated by the federal or
state governments. While the wide range of plans available on exchanges during the
2015 open enrollment period suggests a robust health insurance market, the seminal
work by Iyengar and Lepper [55] suggests that extensive choice can be overwhelm-
ing for customers and lead to greater procrastination before making a choice and/or
dissatisfaction afterward. Specifically, Iyengar and Lepper [55] claim that although
psychological benefits of provision of choice do exist, people are more satisfied when
they are given a more limited number of options, which they can compare more
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easily in order to reach an informed decision. In the context of health insurance
exchanges, Day and Nadash [31] advise that states should align themselves on Mas-
sachusetts in offering only a reasonable but limited set of choices. Similarly, Saxena
and Holobinko [67] demonstrate that too much choice can inhibit consumers and re-
duce the satisfaction they derive from their decision. They also argue that consumers
are highly price sensitive when shopping on exchanges.
The objective of this chapter is to provide an analytical methodology to help
individuals narrow down plan choices by identifying plans that are dominated by
competitors’ offerings in terms of premium, metal level, maximum out of pocket
payment and plan type (such as HMO, POS, EPO or PPO). If a customer makes
her plan choice based on the features above, it is not in her best interest to select a
dominated plan, but a customer who analyzes alone the many plans available on the
exchanges may not realize it and thus may make a less-than-optimal decision for her-
self. Our approach also provides payers with a novel way to analyze their own plans
in the HIX landscape. The high-level goal of this methodology is to contribute to a
wider discussion on making plans offered on the exchanges as compelling as possible
for health exchange customers. We illustrate our methodology using a federal-run
exchange (Pennsylvania) and a state-run exchange (Massachusetts).
3.2 Methodology and Data Sources
The following factors should be considered when comparing marketplace plans: (a)
Plan metal level: Catastrophic (for individuals under the age of 30 with hardship
exemptions) Bronze, Silver, Gold, Platinum, in increasing order of actuarial value,
(b) Monthly premium, (c) Out-of-pocket costs - including deductible, copayments,
co-insurance - up to the out-of-pocket maximum, (d) Type of insurance plan and
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provider network: HMO, POS, EPO or PPO, because each type has different limita-
tions on usage of in-network versus out-of-network doctors and referrals for specialty
care, and (e) Benefits: although all marketplace plans have the same essential health
benefits, cover pre-existing conditions and offer free preventive services, some plans
offer additional benefits.
Intuitively, a plan that has less choice (is of a “worse” type, offering less choice)
and higher premium than another plan should have a better metal level or a lower
maximum out of pocket to justify the higher premium. If it does not, the plan is
said to be, in our terminology, “inefficient” or “dominated.” We do not compare
plans issued by the same payer because we assume that those plans are priced in a
consistent fashion, i.e., a single decision-maker prices plans rationally, with a more
desirable plan always priced higher.
Our objective is to identify “dominated” plans in this framework and quantify
their excess premium, i.e., the amount by which their premium should be decreased
to be made efficient in this framework or the amount that the payer must take great
care in justifying to convince potential enrollees’ of the plan’s value proposition. We
quantify the excess premium in two different ways: by re-running a regression with,
as explanatory variables, either plans by non-dominated payers that are assigned a
good letter grade, such as B or above (Method 1), or plans that are rarely dominated
by other plans, with the precise threshold percentage set by the analyst (Method 2).
Our methodology consists in the following four steps:
1. We identify inefficient plans using an algorithm that - for plans issued by different
payers - compares types (HMO, POS, EPO or PPO), premiums, metal levels and
maximum out of pockets.
2. We run a regression explaining plan premiums using plan features including pay-
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er’s name, and check whether payer’s name is a significant variable. If it is, we assign
a letter grade to each payer using Step 3. Otherwise, we go to Step 4.
3. (Method 1 only) (Step a) For each payer, we compute the percentage of non-
dominated plans offered on the exchange. We cluster payers of similar percentages
and assign each cluster a letter grade. (Step b) We rerun the regression of Step 1
with the payers graded B or higher only. We then compute the estimated premium
that a plan by a payer ranked strictly below B should have had in this model and
compare it to the premiums of a plan with the same attributes offered by a payer
ranked B or higher. The excess premium for a plan by a payer graded strictly below
B is the smallest difference between its plan’s premium and the premium of a similar
plan offered by a high-graded payer, when positive.
4. (Method 2 only) Re-run the regression using only plans that are rarely domi-
nated by other plans, with the threshold percentage being set by the analyst. Then,
compute what the premiums of dominated plans should have been based on their
features for them to be non-dominated. The decrease in premium that the payer
should consider - or the part of the premium that he should more clearly justify - is
the smallest difference between the premium that a non-dominated or efficient plan
should have given the plan features and the regression results.
The algorithm to select efficient plans is described as follows. When selecting
efficient plans, we take four factors into consideration: premium, level, type, and
out-of-pocket maximum. We assume throughout that plans from the same company
are priced appropriately based on their characteristics, i.e., there is no inefficient
plan within the pool offered by a given company. Hence, we only compare plans
from different payers. Our goal is to identify those plans that have higher premiums
with worse benefits. We label a plan P as “inefficient” when we can find another
plan Q such that P’s type (such as HMO or PPO) is the same or worse than Q’s, P’s
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premium is higher than Q’s, and either P’s metal level is worse than Q’s or its metal
level is the same but its out-of-pocket maximum is higher than or equal to Q’s. If
no such Plan Q can be found for a given plan P, Plan P is said to be “efficient”. We
perform those checks using the MATLAB computer programming software.
To investigate whether some payers are more efficient (offer more efficient plans)
than others, we rank payers according to the percentage of efficient plans in their
HIX portfolio. The higher the percentage is, the less likely it is that a payer’s plans
are dominated. Based on those percentages, we use a three-level grading scale: A,
B and C, to group payers, when appropriate (i.e., when payer’s name is a significant
variable). The ranks and grades for insurers in PA and MA are shown in Table 3.6
and Table 3.8, respectively.
For the purpose of plan evaluation, we use linear regression to determine the
weights of attributes of plans in the marketplace. The dependent variable is premi-
um. The independent variables include numeric variables: deductible, out-of-pocket
maximum; categorical (dummy) variables: company, metal level (bronze, etc.), type
(HMO, etc.). We also run individual regression models for each plan level - bronze,
silver, gold ad platinum - using stepwise variable selection.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Data Visualization in the Pennsylvania HIX
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of plans based on metal level, premium and de-
ductible.
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Figure 3.1: Plans in a (premium, deductible) plane according to metal level, PA HIX
We notice that the two plans pointed by arrows have very similar premiums (230
vs 229). However, they have quite different deductibles: the bronze plan is $3400,
and the silver plan is $1700. The bronze plan seems to be inefficient (dominated by
the other plan) because bronze plans are worse than silver plans in terms of cost
sharing, and the bronze plan even has a much higher deductible. It is not the end
of the story yet. We take a closer look at these two plans. The bronze plan is the
Highmark Health Savings Blue PPO 3400, and the silver plan is the Highmark Flex
Blue PPO 1700. They are both PPO plans from Highmark. The only difference
is that the bronze plan is HSA and the silver plan is FSA, where HSA has more
flexibility than FSA. The value of HSA contributes to the total value of the bronze
plan and possibly explains the same premium of these two plans. Another example
is as follows. In this case, although the second plan has zero deductible, its other
benefits such as doctor visits and ER visits are worse than the first plan. This might
lead to their similar premiums.
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Table 3.1: Plans from the same company - Example
Company Plan Level Type Premium Deductible OOP
max
Primary
doc
Specialist
doc
ER Generic
drugs
CBC Healthy
Benefits
PPO
2000.0
Silver PPO $354 $2,000 $6,350 $30 $50 $250 $20 co-
pay AD
CBC Healthy
Benefits
PPO
0.50
Silver PPO $355 $0 $6,350 $50 50% 50% 50%
Therefore, we assume that plans from the same company are priced appropriately
based on their characteristics, aka there must be a reason why two plans from the
same company have the same premium but quite different deductibles. However,
if we compare plans from different companies we would notice that some plans are
indeed inefficient. For example, we look at the following two plans:
Table 3.2: Plans from different companies - Example 1
Company Plan Level Type Premium Deductible OOP
max
Primary
doc
Specialist
doc
ER Generic
drugs
Assurant Health-
Bronze
Plan 002
Bronze PPO $290 $5,000 $6,350 $35 $35 $100
copay
BD/25%
coins AD
25%
coins
Geisinger Choice-
Marketplace
PPO
30/50/5000
Silver PPO $256 $5,000 $6,000 $30 $50 $250 $3 AD
Obviously, the Geisinger plan has better benefits with lower premium. In this
case, we could say that the Assurant plan is inefficient. Another example is as follows.
In this case, all three plans are silver plans. The Highmark plan has best benefits
thus has highest premium. However, the Keystone plan seems to be inefficient due
to its less flexibility (HMO vs. POS) and higher OOP max.
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Table 3.3: Plans from different companies - Example 2
Company Plan Level Type Premium Deductible OOP
max
Primary
doc
Specialist
doc
ER Generic
drugs
Geisinger Marketplace
POS
25/50/2500
Silver POS $256 $2,500 $5,500 $25 $50 $250 $3
Highmark Health Sav-
ings Blue P-
PO 2500
Silver PPO $287 $2,500 $3,500 10%
coins
10%
coins
10%
coins
10%
coins
Keystone Healthy Ben-
efits Value H-
MO 2500.0
Silver HMO $272 $2,500 $6,350 $20 $40 $300 $20 AD
3.3.2 Plan Efficiency Evaluation Results in the Pennsylvania
HIX
We run a regression model both with and without stepwise variable selection, to
remove non-significant variables. Our next step is to include all Company variables,
Level variables, and Deductible then rerun the regression model. Among all the inde-
pendent variables left in the model, all have p-values smaller than 0.05 (significant)
except the dummy variable referring to the Keystone payer and Deductible (shown
in Table 3.4). A summary of the regression models, including R-square values and
variables included, is presented in Table 3.5. The QQ plot is approximately a straight
line, and the residuals are Normal. We therefore argue that this linear model is valid.
Table 3.4: Regression results with stepwise selection - PA
Variable Label DF Parameter estimate Standard error t value Pr> |t|
Intercept Intercept 1 231.8229 11.78069 19.68 <.0001
Company new2 Geisinger 1 -15.2616 7.25866 -2.1 0.04
Company new3 Keystone 1 -4.52886 6.76242 -0.67 0.5058
Company new4 Aetna 1 28.78683 7.44184 3.87 0.0003
Company new5 Assurant 1 70.08725 8.50878 8.24 <.0001
Company new6 CBC 1 74.45939 6.92121 10.76 <.0001
Level new2 Silver 1 49.5767 8.38377 5.91 <.0001
Level new3 Gold 1 97.71053 10.35155 9.44 <.0001
Level new4 Platinum 1 163.9487 14.0219 11.69 <.0001
Deductible Deductible 1 -0.00323 0.00199 -1.63 0.1097
34
Next, we look at the individual regression models for each metal level. Since there
are few plan observations at the bronze and platinum levels, we only investigate the
cases of the silver and gold plans. The regression results illustrate that the identity
of the payer is the most important attribute driving plan premiums. Results of all
regression models on the PA data (for the 18015 zip code and an adult in her late
thirties) are summarized in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Summary of regression models - PA
Model No. of observ. R-square Variables
All variables 66 0.9273 all
Stepwise selection 66 0.9263 all companies, all levels, deductible
Bronze only 12 0.8109 Assurant, CBC, OOP Max
Silver only 28 0.8501 Aetna, Assurant, CBC, Deductible
Gold only 21 0.7816 Geisinger, Assurant, CBC
Platinum only 5 1 Geisinger, HMO, Deductible
We apply the algorithm to identify efficient plans to PA data. Key results are
summarized in Table 3.6. We then rank the payers based on their efficiency ratios.
Here, Highmark and Geisinger have the highest percentage of absolutely efficient
plans and thus, according to our framework, should be recommended to individuals
seeking coverage on the health insurance exchanges.
Table 3.6: Summary of inefficient plans & ranks of companies - PA
Aetna Assurant CBC Geisinger Highmark Keystone
Company sum of dominated times 85 38 109 8 6 64
Number of plans in each company 10 6 11 11 16 12
Number of comparisons 560 360 605 605 800 648
Percent of dominated by others 15.18% 10.56% 18.02% 1.32% 0.75% 9.88%
Number of absolutely efficient plans 0 0 0 3 10 0
Percent of absolutely efficient plans 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 27.27% 62.50% 0.00%
Rank 5 4 6 2 1 3
Grade C B C A A B
It is also interesting to look at the premiums from the perspective of PA general
acute care hospitals’ total margin. Figure 3.2 below is the average total margins over
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regions in PA for fiscal year 2013. Figure 3.3 is the coverage areas served by blue
plans in PA.
Figure 3.2: Hospital total margin - PA Figure 3.3: Coverage area - PA
source: http://pablueagent.com/coverage.php
Hospitals in region 5 and region 7 have the highest margins, while these two
regions are areas where CBC mostly cover. This observation might indicate one of
the reasons why CBC generally has higher premiums and more number of inefficient
plans: CBC pays more to hospitals than other insurers, thus they need to increase
premiums to keep in business, which might leads them to less competitive position
in the market. On the contrary, hospitals in areas covered by Highmark in general
have very low margins, which supports our conclusion from another perspective.
3.3.3 Plan Efficiency Evaluation Results in Massachusetts
HIX
We use data obtained for the 02142 zipcode for an adult in her late thirties. Only
one plan offered is PPO, and seven plans are EPO; however, these seven EPO plans
are all from United Health Care, and all United Health Care plans are EPO plans.
As a result, we exclude “Type” in the regression model since it is already captured
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in the “Company” (“Payer”) variable.
Compared to Pennsylvania plans, Massachusetts plans have far fewer deductible
levels (see [89] for the MA counterpart to Figure 3.1). We run a regression model
to identify the factors attributed to plan premiums. The R-square of this model is
0.8402, which is very good. All variables except the payer Tufts and Out-of-pocket
maximum are significant at the 5% level. The residual plots (not shown here) suggest
that this model fits quite well. Specifically, the QQ plot is almost a straight line, and
the residuals follow a Normal distribution. We also apply stepwise variable selection
to MA plans but all variables are selected by the program, leading back to the original
model.
We also apply regression models to plans at each metal level. More plans are
offered in the 02142 Massachusetts zip code than in the 18015 Pennsylvania zip
code, so the results are more convincing. Also note that the MA plans studied here
tend to have higher metal levels, where silver is the dominant metal level in PA and
gold is dominant in MA. The regression results shown in Table 3.7 indicate that
the payer is still the most important attribute in plan premiums. Therefore, it is
meaningful to compare plans from different companies and rank companies based on
plan efficiency.
Table 3.7: Summary of regression models - MA
Model No. of observ. R-squared Variables
Model with all variables 106 0.8402 all
Stepwise selection 106 0.8402 all
Bronze only 14 0.4675 MA BCBS, OOP Max
Silver only 20 0.6077 Fallon, Harvard, MA BCBS, United
Gold only 48 0.6803 Fallon, Harvard, MA BCBS, Tufts, United
Platinum only 24 0.7408 Fallon, Harvard, MA BCBS, Tufts, United
We apply the algorithm to all MA plans. Key results are summarized in Table 3.8.
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Companies in MA are ranked and given grades in the same fashion as companies in
PA. Based on this framework, plans provided by United HealthCare, Boston Medical
Center and Minuteman Health particularly deserve recommendation.
Table 3.8: Summary of inefficient plans & ranks of companies - MA
Ambetter BMC Fallon Harvard BCBS Minuteman NHP Tufts United
Company sum of dominated
times
71 9 602 231 243 14 39 90 2
Number of plans in each
company
9 7 27 13 10 9 9 13 7
Number of comparisons 855 679 2079 1183 940 855 855 1183 679
Percent of dominated by
others (%)
8.3 1.33 28.96 19.53 25.85 1.64 4.56 7.61 0.29
Number of absolutely effi-
cient plans
1 3 0 1 1 4 1 2 5
Percent of absolutely effi-
cient plans (%)
11.11 42.86 0 7.69 10 44.44 11.11 15.38 71.43
Rank 6 2 9 7 8 3 4 5 1
Grade B A C C C A B B A
3.4 Recommendations for Other States and Health
Policy Makers
To extend our methodology to other states besides MA and PA, analysts should
first identify any unique characteristics of plans in the state once they have obtained
the summary statistics of plan premium and benefits. For example, the types of
MA plans (HMO, PPO and EPO) are different from the PA plans (HMO, PPO and
POS), and it turns out that we can discard the Type variable in the MA regression
model. The second step is to utilize regression models to decide whether a payer
(name) is the most important indicator of inefficiency/efficiency. If it is, then we feel
justified in assigning grades to payers; otherwise, we have to implement a different
method (Method 2) to compute premiums.
Health payers with offerings less compelling (as quantified by this framework)
than their competitors may wish to discuss internally the assumptions that led their
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analysts to pricing the plan higher than what the regression model recommends,
potential ways to realize savings in order to decrease premiums, or a stronger posi-
tioning of their plan to justify the apparent inefficiency using a different quantitative
metric.
We now illustrate possible recommendations to health insurance companies using
the Capital Blue Cross (CBC) payer in Pennsylvania. CBC has a total of eleven
plans but zero absolutely efficient plan, and is thus given the grade of C. In order to
give suggestions to CBC regarding the size in premium reduction that would make
its plans more competitive in our model, we first conduct regression on plans from
payers graded A or B (Highmark, Geisinger, Keystone, and Assurant) since they are
the “aspirational peers” of payers ranked C. Then we apply the regression results to
CBC plans in order to get approximate premiums for plans with such characteristics
offered by A or B payers. Based on 45 plans from grade A and grade B companies,
the R-squared of the model is 0.8919 and the adjusted R-squared is 0.8602, both of
which are very high. Although the F statistic is significant, some of the variables are
not very significant at the individual level. As a result, we apply stepwise variable
selection on the model. After the stepwise variable selection, the Type variables and
Deductible are excluded from the model. We include the selected variables and run
the regression model again. The R-square drops down slightly to 0.8896 but the
adjusted R-square goes up to 0.8687.
Our next step is to apply the regression coefficients to CBC plans. Table 3.9
shows the estimated premiums of each CBC plan if they were plans from grade A
and B companies. (Those estimated premiums are all smaller than the actual ones.)
Well-priced plans are in bold. This gives CBC an estimate of the premium decreases
they should achieve in order to stay competitive in the market. Alternatively, this is
a measure of how much CBC feels they will attract sicker patients due to their name
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recognition.
Table 3.9: Estimated premiums - CBC Healthy Benefits (HB), PA, Method 1.
Plan Level Type Deduct. OOP Max Prem. Est Pre Highm Est Pre Geis. Est Pre Keyst. Est Pre Assurant
PPO 5500.50 Bronze PPO 5500 6350 277 220.86 202.67 220.73 289.44
PPO 3000.0 Gold PPO 3000 6350 398 321.54 303.35 321.42 390.12
PPO 1000.0 Gold PPO 1000 6350 402 321.54 303.35 321.42 390.12
PPO 500.0 Gold PPO 500 6350 410 321.54 303.35 321.42 390.12
PPO 0.0.10 Platinum PPO 0 6350 467 389.63 371.44 389.51 458.21
PPO 4500.50 Silver PPO 4500 6350 335 269.29 251.11 269.17 337.87
PPO 3500.0 Silver PPO 3500 6350 341 269.29 251.11 269.17 337.87
PPO 2500.0 Silver PPO 2500 6350 347 269.29 251.11 269.17 337.87
PPO 2000.0 Silver PPO 2000 6350 354 269.29 251.11 269.17 337.87
PPO 0.50 Silver PPO 0 6350 355 269.29 251.11 269.17 337.87
PPO 0.0 Silver PPO 0 6350 365 269.29 251.11 269.17 337.87
The estimated premiums give us ranges of premiums for efficient plans with same
benefits. Out of the eleven plans, two CBC plans’ premiums (highlighted in bold)
are within the ranges determined by efficient plans, solely because they have lower
premiums than Assurant’s corresponding plans. The reason could be that Assurant
is only slightly better than CBC (rank 4th vs. 6th) in spite of being ranked B instead
of C, so that occasionally CBC plans are more efficient than Assurant’s.
We calculated the estimated premiums for Aetna plans (grade C) in a similar
fashion (shown in Table 3.10). We notice that Aetna plans are always more expensive
than plans from Highmark, Geisinger and Keystone with the same benefits. However,
they are always cheaper than the corresponding Assurant plans as well. This is not
surprising because their ranks are even closer (rank 4th vs. 5th). As a result, it is
more likely that Aetna has more efficient than Assurant compared to CBC.
Table 3.10: Estimated premiums - Aetna
Plan Level Type Deduct. OOP Max Prem. P Highm. P Geis. P Keyst. P Assu.
Deduct. only HSA eligible HMP Bronze HMO 6300 6300 223 220.97 202.78 220.84 289.54
Deduct. only HSA eligible OAMC Bronze POS 6300 6300 232 220.97 202.78 220.84 289.54
$20 copay OAMC Bronze POS 5750 6600 247 220.33 202.15 220.21 288.91
$20 copay HMO Bronze HMO 5750 6600 237 220.33 202.15 220.21 288.91
$5 copay HMO Gold HMO 1400 5000 342 324.39 306.20 324.27 392.97
$5 copay OAMC Gold POS 1400 5000 354 324.39 306.20 324.27 392.97
$10 copay HMO Silver HMO 3750 6600 295 268.77 250.58 268.64 337.34
$10 copay OAMC Silver POS 3750 6600 306 268.77 250.58 268.64 337.34
$5 copay 2750 HMO Silver HMO 2750 6000 312 270.03 251.84 269.91 338.61
$5 copay 2750 OAMC Silver POS 2750 6000 323 270.03 251.84 269.91 338.61
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We also run Method 2, with a threshold percentage of plan being dominated by
at most 10% other plans. There are 44 such plans. The R-square is 0.9068. The
highest excess premium is $53 (for a monthly premium of $323), achieved for Aetna
Silver $5 copay 2750 OAMC. (2750 is the deductible for the plan and OAMC stands
for Open-Access Managed Choice.) In fact, the four plans with the highest excess
premium are Aetna plans. This may not mean that they are overpriced, but Aetna
should make sure that its plans’ value proposition is well understood. The most
underpriced plan is Capital Blue Cross Healthy Benefits PPO 5500.50, which has a
monthly premium of $277 although the model estimates the premium at $296, and
the second most underpriced plan is Keystone Healthy Benefits Value HMO 1000.0
(monthly premium $315, estimated premium $325). Those results are shown in Table
3.11.
Table 3.11: Estimated premiums - PA, Method 2
Plan Level Type Deductible OOP Max Prem. Est Prem. Decrease
Aetna Gold $5 copay HMO Gold HMO 1400 5000 342 325 17
Aetna Gold $5 copay OAMC Gold POS 1400 5000 354 325 29
Aetna Silver $10 copay HMO Silver HMO 3750 6600 295 270 25
Aetna Silver $10 copay OAMC Silver POS 3750 6600 306 270 36
Aetna Silver $5 copay 2750 HMO Silver HMO 2750 6000 312 270 42
Aetna Silver $5 copay 2750 OAMC Silver POS 2750 6000 323 270 53
Assurant Health - Bronze Plan 002 Bronze PPO 5000 6350 290 289 1
Assurant Health - Gold Plan 002 Gold PPO 0 6350 409 387 22
Assurant Health - Silver Plan 002 Silver PPO 2000 6350 340 331 9
Healthy Benefits (HB) PPO 5500.50 Bronze PPO 5500 6350 277 296 -19
Healthy Benefits (HB) PPO 3000.0 Gold PPO 3000 6350 398 394 4
Healthy Benefits (HB) PPO 1000.0 Gold PPO 1000 6350 402 394 8
Healthy Benefits (HB) PPO 500.0 Gold PPO 500 6350 410 394 16
Healthy Benefits (HB) PPO 4500.50 Silver PPO 4500 6350 335 339 -4
Healthy Benefits (HB) PPO 3500.0 Silver PPO 3500 6350 341 339 2
Healthy Benefits (HB) PPO 2500.0 Silver PPO 2500 6350 347 339 8
Healthy Benefits (HB) PPO 2000.0 Silver PPO 2000 6350 354 339 15
Healthy Benefits (HB) PPO 0.50 Silver PPO 0 6350 355 339 16
Healthy Benefits (HB) PPO 0.0 Silver PPO 0 6350 365 339 26
Keystone Healthy Benefits Value HMO 1000.0 Gold HMO 1000 6350 315 325 -10
Keystone Blue Cross Value HMO 500.0 Gold HMO 500 6350 322 325 -3
Keystone Healthy Benefits Value HMO 0.0 Silver HMO 0 6350 287 270 17
There is concern that some insurance companies might set their prices lower than
others on purpose to attract new customers in the exchanges, and raise their prices in
later years. Since the exchanges are new to both insurers and customers, prices can be
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adjusted over time to reflect learning from new information. Although it is possible
that some insurers appear to be more efficient, while some others being “inefficient”
due to short-term pricing strategy, our approach still provides a novel way to aid
customer’s choice of plan and to help insurers analyze their plans. More years of
data could be incorporated when the Health Insurance Marketplaces become more
mature, and the long-term efficiency of plans could be evaluated in our framework.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the important drivers of plan premiums in the health ex-
changes, with examples drawn from the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts health in-
surance marketplaces. We propose a simple algorithm to identify plans that are
dominated by competitors’ offerings in terms of premium, metal level, maximum
out of pocket payment and plan type. We assign letter grades to payers, and use
linear regression results to quantify the amount by which the premium of a dominat-
ed plan should be reduced to make it competitive in our framework. This chapter
provides important quantitative tools to guide the discussions between payers and
policy-makers regarding HIX. Our approach also provides payers with a novel way
to analyze their own plans in the HIX landscape.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of Medicare Prescription
Drug Coverage Enrollment
4.1 Introduction
The Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 pro-
vides outpatient prescription drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries through private
insurers. The coverage is available for Medicare beneficiaries in two ways: Medicare
Advantage prescription plans (MAPDs), and stand-alone prescription plans (PDP-
s). This chapter provides an overview of these two types of prescription drug plans
and identify factors associated with Medicare beneficiaries’ choices over MAPDs and
PDPs in all counties in the United States using beta regression.
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4.2 Background: PDPs vs. MA-PDs
Medicare is a national social insurance program administered by the U.S. federal gov-
ernment since 1966. It covers people aged 65 and over and people with permanent
disabilities. Currently about 54 million people are under coverage of Medicare. It
has four parts: (1)Part A: Hospital Insurance, which covers most medically necessary
hospital, skilled nursing facility, nursing home and hospice care; (2)Part B: Medical
Insurance, which covers most medically necessary doctors’ services, preventive care,
durable medical equipment, hospital outpatient services, laboratory tests, x-rays,
mental health care, and some home health and ambulance services; (3)Part C: Medi-
care Advantage plans, which allows private health insurance companies to provide
Medicare benefits since the passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997; (4)Part
D: Prescription Drug Plans, which provides outpatient prescription drug coverage.
Among these four parts, Part D was established by the Medicare Modernization Act
of 2003 (MMA) and went into effect in 2006.
Medicare beneficiaries have two ways for receiving prescription drug coverage
starting in 2006. One way is to enroll in the Medicare Advantage plans (mainly HMOs
and PPOs) then enroll in their Part D prescription drug plans (MAPD). Medicare
Advantage plans are provided by private insurance companies that have a contract
with Medicare. In 2014, 83% of Medicare Advantage plans offer prescription drug
coverage, and 50% provide some coverage in what is known as the “coverage gap”,
after a spending limit is exceeded but before the maximum out-of-pocket payment
is attained. All MAPD enrollees receive a 50% discount on brand-name drugs in the
gap, beginning in 2011. Since 2011, all Medicare Advantage plans have been required
to limit beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket spending to no more than $6,700. Medicare
Advantage beneficiaries need to enroll in both Part A and Part B. Many MA-PDs
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provide prescription drug coverage and other supplemental benefits available for no
additional premium. However, Medicare Advantage plan monthly premiums (if any)
are in addition to Medicare A (if required) and Medicare B premiums.
The other way to get prescription drug coverage is to enroll in Prescription Drug
Plans (PDP) provided by Medicare directly. In order to enroll into a Medicare Part
D PDP, enrollment in either Medicare Part A and/or Medicare Part B is required.
Medicare Part D premiums are in addition to Medicare Part A (if any) and/or
Part B premiums; however, original Medicare doesn’t have the cap on out-of-pocket
spending.
In 2014, 37 million out of 54 million Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in part D
plans. Among these part D plan enrollees, more than 37% of all Medicare beneficia-
ries enrolled in part D in late 2013 were in an MA-PD, with the remaining 63 percent
in a freestanding PDP. Another large group of Medicare beneficiaries get prescription
drug coverage under plans offered by former employers such as the Department of
Veterans Affairs. Enrollment in Medicare drug plans is voluntary, with the exception
of beneficiaries who are dually eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid and certain
other low-income beneficiaries who are automatically enrolled in a PDP if they do
not choose a plan on their own.
In terms of plan availability, MAPD plans and PDP plans are quite different.
The national average number of PDP plans in 2012 is 31, and the national average
number of MAPD plans is 60; however, the number of PDP plans in each state is
quite similar as almost every state has about 30 PDP plans; while the number of
MAPD plans in each state varies from 1 to 250.
Cline et.al [27] use multivariate probit models to describe factors associated with
Medicare beneficiaries’ choices in enrolling any part D plans, and their choices of
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an MAPD plan given enrollment in the part D program. Their data is collected
from surveys of 5000 community-dwelling adults in CMS Region 25, which includes
7 states: Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Montana and
Wyoming. Only 32.4% of responses are actually used in the analysis. They find
that factors including rurality, plan price, perceived future need for medications, and
preferences are driving people’s choices of enrolling in a part D plan; while rurality,
state of residence, and number of diagnosed medical conditions are contributing to
people’s decision to enroll in a MAPD plan given enrollment in a part D plan. As
their data is collected from surveys and is detailed at member level, they are able to
conduct probit model since their response variables would be binary.
However, data at member level is not always available. Therefore, the objective
of this chapter is to identify factors associated with penetration rates of MAPD
plans and PDP plans based on publicly available census data and plan data. We
utilize a relatively new regression method, called beta regression, when describing
factors associated with people’s choice. This method is particularly suitable for our
penetration data sine it incorporates natural properties of variables whose value lies
in the open interval (0, 1) such as proportions or penetration rates instead of being
binary (0 or 1, yes or no) such as enrollment decision for each member.
4.3 Data Description
Our data combines three sources: penetration data, census data, and part D plan
data. All data are from year 2012. The dependent variables are penetration rates
of MAPD and PDP, which are retrieved from Kaiser Family Foundation’s “MA-PD
Plan Enrollment as a Percent of Total Medicare Population” table [42]. The reason
why we don’t use the Medicare Advantage/Part D Contract and Enrollment Data
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available on CMS’s website [37] is that CMS’s data has the total MA enrollment.
However, what we need is the PD enrollment data only, which should be lower
than total MA enrollment. We use the PDP penetration data from Kaiser Family
Foundation’s database to be consistent with our choice of MAPD penetration data.
When number of enrollees in one county is 10 or less, the penetration rate is reported
as zero due to the privacy laws of HIPAA. We exclude Alaska because Alaska is the
only state that has zero MAPD penetration rate, while its PDP penetration rate
is 39%. According to Kaiser Family Foundation, there were no private insurance
companies in Alaska offering Medicare Advantage plans in 2012. There were 69
beneficiaries who were enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans, which made up less
than 0.1% of all the Medicare beneficiaries in the state. Since PDP is absolutely
dominant in Alaska, comparison between MAPD and PDP penetration rates would
not be meaningful.
Initially, there are 36 independent variables including demographic variables, con-
dition variables, cost variables and plan variables. These data come from three
sources: the “State/County Table - All Beneficiaries” from CMS’s public use files [39],
the “State & County QuickFacts” from US Census Bureau [21], and “Plan & Pre-
mium Information for Medicare Plans Offering Part D” from CMS [38]. Most of the
variables are from the public use files as they represent Medicare beneficiaries’ data,
while a few variables come from the census due to significant large number of miss-
ing values or lack of data in the public use files. We have data for 3029 counties in
the United States. The correlations between independent variables and penetration
rates are provided in table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Correlations of variables
MAPD rate PDP rate total rate
cnt mapd 0.57 -0.44 0.06
cnt pdp -0.06 0.08 0.05
Average Age -0.28 0.19 -0.07
Percent Female -0.06 0.19 0.19
Percent Male 0.06 -0.19 -0.19
Percent Non Hispanic White -0.04 0.08 0.07
Percent African American -0.04 0.10 0.09
Percent Hispanic 0.08 -0.05 0.04
Percent Other Unknown 0.06 -0.13 -0.10
Bachelor degree or higher perc 0.15 -0.32 -0.26
Homeownership rate -0.05 0.07 0.03
Per capita money income 0.09 -0.27 -0.26
Persons below poverty level per -0.06 0.20 0.20
Percent Eligible for Medicaid 0.07 0.17 0.31
Average HCC Score 0.21 -0.06 0.16
Percent of heart attack -0.06 0.09 0.06
Percent of atrial fibrillation -0.02 0.05 0.04
Percent of kidney disease 0.22 -0.11 0.11
Percent of obstructive pulmonary -0.12 0.18 0.10
Percent of depression 0.20 -0.05 0.16
Percent of diabetes 0.00 0.12 0.16
Percent of heart failure -0.19 0.26 0.14
Percent of ischemic heart -0.14 0.17 0.07
Percent of breast cancer 0.07 -0.14 -0.13
Percent of colorectal cancer -0.17 0.24 0.14
Percent of lung cancer -0.06 0.05 0.00
Percent of prostate cancer -0.01 -0.05 -0.09
Percent of asthma 0.15 -0.20 -0.11
Percent of hypertension -0.06 0.15 0.13
Percent of high cholesterol 0.10 -0.10 -0.01
Percent of arthritis -0.12 0.15 0.07
Percent of osteoporosis 0.07 -0.07 0.00
Percent of alzheimer 0.05 0.01 0.09
Percent of stroke 0.07 -0.09 -0.04
Part B Drugs Standardized Costs perc 0.09 -0.10 -0.04
Percent of Beneficiaries Using PB 0.14 -0.15 -0.04
All correlations with absolute value higher than 0.20 are highlighted in table 4.1.
The number of available MAPD plans is highly correlated with MAPD and PDP
penetration rates. The more MAPD plans in a county, the higher their MAPD pen-
etration rate and the lower their PDP penetration rate. Other variables that have
relatively high correlations with prescription drug plan penetration rates include
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average age of Medicare beneficiaries, percentage of population with Bachelor’s de-
gree or higher, per capita income, percentage of Medicare beneficiaries who are also
eligible for Medicaid, average HCC score, and a few other medical conditions. In-
terestingly, most independent variables have opposite correlations with the MAPD
penetration rate and with the PDP penetration rate. For example, the correlation
between average age and MAPD rate is -0.28, while the correlation between average
age and PDP rate is 0.19. This suggests that counties having Medicare population
with higher average age tend to see their Medicare members enroll in PDP plans
rather than MAPD plans. Also, counties with a higher percentage of people with
Bachelor’s degree or higher are more likely to enroll in MAPD plans than PDP plan-
s. Hence, these attributes have different impacts on these two types of prescription
drug plans.
4.4 Statistical Models on Enrollment Rate of PDP
and MA-PD Drug Plans
Our response variables - penetration rates - always lie between 0 and 1. Because
of the small range for the values taken by the penetration rates, this suggests that
the effect of explanatory variables tends to be non-linear, and the variance tends to
decrease when the mean gets closer to one of the boundaries. Linear regression and
logistic regression are not attractive for our purposes: linear regression might give us
predictions out of the restricted range and logistic regression requires the distribution
of response variable to be binomial, while our response variable here is not the results
of a set of Bernoulli trials. One possible solution is to transform the response variable
then model the transformed response variable on explanatory variables. However,
this approach has drawbacks. First, the coefficients cannot be easily interpreted in
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terms of the original response variable. Second, asymmetry often exists in rates or
proportions, so that inference based on the normality assumption can be misleading.
We introduce another regression model, called beta regression, which is more
suitable for our data. Beta regression assumes that the response variable follows a
continuous beta distribution and is related to other variables through a regression
structure. The estimation of coefficients are conducted by Maximum Likelihood Es-
timation (MLE). Beta distribution is a family of continuous probability distributions
defined on the interval [0, 1] parameterized by two positive shape parameters: mean
and precision. The density function of beta distribution is given by
pi(y; p, q) =
Γ(p+ q)
Γ(p)Γ(q)
yp−1(1− y)p−1, 0 < y < 1 (4.1)
where p > 0,q > 0 and Γ(.) is the gamma function. The mean and variance of y are
E(y) =
p
p+ q
(4.2)
and
V ar(y) =
pq
(p+ q)2(p+ q + 1)
(4.3)
respectively. Examples of beta distribution are shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Examples of Beta Distribution by Varying Shape Parameters
This conventional parameterization with two shape parameters is not particularly
suitable for modeling mean of response variable on explanatory variables. Ferrari
and Cribari-Neto [36] propose an alternative parametrization by letting µ =
p
q
and
φ = p + q such that µ is the mean of response variable and φ is the precision
parameter. Then the density function of y becomes
f(y;µ, φ) =
Γ(φ)
Γ(µφ)Γ((1− µ)φ)y
µφ−1(1− y)(1−µ)φ−1, 0 < y < 1 (4.4)
where 0 < µ < 1 and φ > 0.
Now we briefly describe beta regression and how it is different from linear regres-
sion of transformed response variable. Let y1, ..., yn be independent random response
variables, where each yt for t = 1, ...n follows the beta distribution’s density (4.4).
The mean of yt is µt and the precision is φ. The beta regression model is obtained
by assuming that µt, which is the mean of yt that can be written as
g(µt) =
k∑
i=1
xtiβi = ηt, (4.5)
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where β = (β1, ..., βk)
T is a vector of unknown regression coefficients, and xt1, ...xtk
are observations on k regressors (k < n). This indicates the difference between
beta regression and linear regression of transformed response variable. In linear
regression model would be g(yt) =
k∑
i=1
xtiβi, while in beta regression it is g(µt) that
has a regression structure. Therefore, the regression parameters are interpretable in
terms of the mean of response variable in beta regression, and the model is naturally
heteroscedastic and easily accommodates asymmetries.
In addition, g(.) is a strictly monotonic and twice differentiable link function that
maps (0,1) to R. Possible choices of link function g(µt) include:
• logit function: g(µ) = log µ
1− µ ,
• probit function: g(µ) = Φ−1(µ), where Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution
function of a standard normal distributed variable,
• complementary log-log link: g(µ) = log{−log(1− µ)},
• log-log link: g(µ) = −log{−log(µ)}.
One commonly used link function, which is the default one used in “betareg”
package in R, is the logit function. In this case, the link function is presented as
g(µ) = log
µ
1− µ = x
T
t β, (4.6)
which, after simple manipulation, can be written as
µt =
ex
T
t β
1 + ex
T
t β
, (4.7)
where xTt = (xt1, ..., xtk), t = 1, ..., n. Therefore, the mean of yt can be easily in-
terpreted by the regression parameters. If the value of ith independent variable is
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increased by c units, and all other independent variables remain unchanged. Let µ′
be the mean of y under new values of variables, then we have
ecβi =
µ′/(1− µ′)
µ/(1− µ) . (4.8)
It means ecβi equals the ratio of odds under two sets of values. Beta regression uses
maximum likelihood estimation to obtain β and φ, and it does not have a closed-form
solution. Therefore, the parameter estimates are obtained by numerically maximizing
the log-likelihood function using a nonlinear optimization algorithm, such as Newton
method or quasi-Newton algorithm. To start the algorithm, β estimates from OLS
linear regression of transformed response variable can be used as initial values [36].
SAS can implement beta regression using procedures NLMIXED, NLIN or GLIM-
MIX. A macro called Beta Regression in SAS is available for implementation pur-
pose [79]. Beta regression can also be implemented in R using package “betareg” [28].
The implementation results using the “betareg” package in R are shown in the next
section.
4.5 Beta Regression Implementation Results in R
One limitation of beta regression is that it excludes values 0 and 1. However, due
to the privacy law of HIPAA, there are 171 penetration rates that are reported as
zero as the numbers of enrollees in those counties are ten or less. In order to proceed
utilizing beta regression, we removed these 171 points from our dataset. Another way
to address the zero rates without losing any data point is to transform the response
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variable y into open interval (0, 1) by taking
y′ =
y(N − 1) + 0.5
N
(4.9)
where N is the sample size, proposed by Smithson and Verkuilen [72]. The rationale
for this rescaling is presented in their paper as well. The regression models using
transformed response variable perform worse than the models without zero rates.
Therefore, in this chapter we only present the regression results based on the first
method, which removes observations with “zero” (or removed) penetration rates.
For MAPD plans, the beta regression is applied to all data points (as opposed to
splitting the data in a training and testing data set to create then test our model)
since our purpose in using analytics here is descriptive rather than predictive or
prescriptive in nature. Logit, probit, cloglog and loglog link functions are used. For
MAPD plans, the loglog link function performs the best with highest pseudo R2 and
smallest AIC (Akaike Information Criterion). Therefore, we choose the loglog link
function to proceed with the model build.
Table 4.2: Comparisons of results using different link functions
Link function Log-likelihood Pseudo R2 AIC
Logit 3510 0.4837 -7002.891
Probit 3528 0.5081 -7032.214
Cloglog 3486 0.4712 -6957.166
Loglog 3557 0.5257 -7076.105
We first include all potential independent variables in the beta regression model;
however, some of the variables such as the percentage of people with heart attack
are not statistically significant in the full model. We thus delete all non-significant
variables and fit the model again until all variables left in the model are significant
at the 0.05 significance level. The regression coefficients are illustrated in table 4.3.
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The significance codes are: 0.000001 ‘***’, 0.001 ‘**’, 0.01 ‘*’, 0.05 ‘.’, 0.1 ‘ ’.
Table 4.3: Parameter estimates - MAPD
Parameter Estimate Std. error z value Pr(> |z|) Sig. code
(Intercept) 2.4790 0.3156 7.855 0.0000 ***
cnt mapd 0.0208 0.0007 29.439 0.0000 ***
Average Age -0.0508 0.0042 -12.04 0.0000 ***
Percent Female -0.8483 0.2964 -2.862 0.0042 **
Percent Non Hispanic White 0.1874 0.0388 4.831 0.0000 ***
Bachelor degree or higher perc -0.4411 0.0790 -5.581 0.0000 ***
Homeownership rate 0.4534 0.0778 5.83 0.0000 ***
Percent Eligible for Medicaid -0.2359 0.0961 -2.454 0.0141 *
Average HCC Score 1.5523 0.1310 11.85 0.0000 ***
Percent of kidney disease 0.9764 0.2592 3.767 0.0002 ***
Percent of obstructive pulmonary -2.2263 0.2395 -9.295 0.0000 ***
Percent of diabetes -1.3787 0.2214 -6.226 0.0000 ***
Percent of ischemic heart -1.4635 0.1359 -10.768 0.0000 ***
Percent of breast cancer -1.7833 0.9687 -1.841 0.0656 .
Percent of colorectal cancer -3.6122 1.2072 -2.992 0.0028 **
Percent of hypertension -1.1590 0.1552 -7.467 0.0000 ***
Percent of high cholesterol 0.5189 0.1105 4.696 0.0000 ***
Percent of alzheimer 0.9932 0.3452 2.877 0.0040 **
Part B Drugs Standardized Costs perc 0.8453 0.3578 2.362 0.0182 *
Percent of Beneficiaries Using PB 0.2277 0.0557 4.086 0.0000 ***
φ 26.8666 0.7452 36.05 0.0000 ***
Several diagnostic measures are provided to measure the goodness-of-fit of the
model and influential observations. The log-likelihood is 3999, and AIC is -7956.1.
The pseudo R2 of the model for MAPD plans is 0.527, where pseudo R2 is defined as
the square of the sample correlation coefficient between ηˆ and g(y) and is thus very
similar to the R2 in OLS linear regression. All explanatory variables are significant
at the 0.05 significance level. The diagnostic plot in figure 4.2 also shows the model
fits quite well except for a few outliers. The parameter estimates and pseudo R2
exhibit little change when we fit the model without the outliers.
The model can be specified as
g(µt) = β0 +
19∑
k=1
βkxtk (4.10)
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where βk are the coefficients we get from the beta regression, and xtk are the 19 in-
dependent variables we select to include in the model. Coefficients estimates in table
4.3 quantify the relationship between each independent variable and the response
variable. For instance, there is a positive relationship between average HCC score
and MAPD plan penetration. The average HCC score indicates the average health
status of Medicare beneficiaries. A higher average HCC score means worse health
status of the county’s Medicare population. Take variable “cnt mapd” for example,
which is the number of MAPD plans available in the county. The coefficient estimate
of this variable in the beta regression can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that the
number of MAPD plans available increases by 1, then the log of the ratio between
chances of enrolling in a MAPD plan under the new setting relative to the old set-
ting, all other variables remaining the same, is 0.0208. φ is the precision parameter
estimated from beta regression which defines the shape the beta distribution of the
response variable.
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Figure 4.2: Diagnostic plots of MAPD plans
As in the model for MAPD plans, the loglog link function performs best for PDP
plan penetration rates and total penetration rates.
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Table 4.4: Summary of diagnostic statistics for MAPD, PDP, and Total
Model Link function Log-likelihood Pseudo R2 AIC
MAPD
loglog 3999 0.527 -7956.1
logit 3533 0.4837 -7002.89
probit 3548 0.5081 -7032.21
cloglog 3511 0.4712 -6957.17
PDP
loglog 3210 0.5795 -6369.2
logit 2891 0.5513 -5717.93
probit 2887 0.5527 -5710.76
cloglog 2899 0.5439 -5734.13
Total
loglog 3687 0.3683 -7330.4
logit 3334 0.356 -6603.09
probit 3333 0.356 -6602.03
cloglog 3330 0.3557 -6576.76
All models’ pseudo R2’s are reasonably high, especially the model for the PDP
plans, and the diagnostic plots also indicate that the models fit well. To address
the potential problem of overfitting, we also split the whole dataset into training
set and test set by the 70/30 rule. The model is built on the training set, and the
regression result is applied to the test set. The model based on training data has
very similar pseudo R2’s for all models. And the MSE’s (Mean Squared Error) of the
predictions on test data are about 0.01, which is acceptable low to justify that our
model is properly fitted. Table 4.5 summarizes the coefficients estimates of significant
variables for the three models. Note that N/A means the variable is not significant
in the model. Also, a few variables show coefficients as zero. However, the actual
coefficient estimate of these variables are very small numbers close to zero, but not
zero exactly. Details of regression results are in the appendix.
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Table 4.5: Summary of coefficients estimates for MAPD, PDP, and Total
PDP MAPD Total
Parameter Estimate Signi. Estimate Signi. Estimate Signi.
(Intercept) -5.9280 *** 2.4790 *** -2.9850 ***
cnt mapd -0.0118 *** 0.0208 *** 0.0037 ***
cnt pdp 0.0143 *** N/A N/A 0.0113 ***
Average Age 0.0575 *** -0.0508 *** 0.0206 ***
Percent Female 3.1290 *** -0.8483 ** 2.3480 ***
Percent Non Hispanic White 0.1679 *** 0.1874 *** 0.3108 ***
Bachelor degree or higher perc -0.4015 *** -0.4411 *** -0.8792 ***
Homeownership rate -0.3007 *** 0.4534 *** N/A N/A
Per capita money income 0.0000 *** N/A N/A 0.0000 .
Persons below poverty level per 0.8762 *** N/A N/A 0.5370 ***
Percent Eligible for Medicaid 1.5300 *** -0.2359 * 1.5880 ***
Average HCC Score -1.1170 *** 1.5523 *** 0.2831 **
Percent of atrial fibrillation 0.8717 . N/A N/A 1.5850 ***
Percent of depression N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.3751 *
Percent of heart failure N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.3908 *
Percent of kidney disease -0.6750 ** 0.9764 *** N/A N/A
Percent of obstructive pulmonary 1.1110 *** -2.2263 *** -1.1500 ***
Percent of diabetes 1.3410 *** -1.3787 *** N/A N/A
Percent of ischemic heart 0.8841 *** -1.4635 *** N/A N/A
Percent of breast cancer N/A N/A -1.7833 . N/A N/A
Percent of colorectal cancer 4.6670 *** -3.6122 ** 3.8520 ***
Percent of prostate cancer 1.7760 * N/A N/A N/A N/A
Percent of asthma -1.7180 *** N/A N/A -2.2520 ***
Percent of hypertension 1.0210 *** -1.1590 *** N/A N/A
Percent of high cholesterol -0.8609 *** 0.5189 *** -0.4981 ***
Percent of alzheimer -1.3240 *** 0.9932 ** N/A N/A
Percent of stroke -2.6300 *** N/A N/A -3.2040 ***
Part B Drugs Standardized Costs perc N/A N/A 0.8453 * 0.5984 .
Percent of Beneficiaries Using PB N/A N/A 0.2277 *** 0.1324 **
All models share most variables, with some exceptions where some variables are
significant in one model but might not be significant in others. For example, the
variable that indicates percentage of people who have asthma has negative impact
on PDP penetration but has no significant impact on MAPD penetration. This
means that counties where fewer people have asthma tend to enroll in PDP plans.
In contrast, the variable about the percentage of beneficiaries using Part B has a
positive relationship with MAPD plan penetration, but not PDP plan penetration.
This makes sense since it is required to enroll in both Part A and Part B in order to
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enroll in MAPD plans. Similar factors include number of PDP plans available, per
capita money income, percentage of people below poverty level, percentage of people
with atrial fibrillation/breast cancer/prostate cancer/stroke, and Part B drug stan-
dardized Medicare costs as a percentage of total standardized Medicare costs. Two
variables have the same positive/negative signs of their coefficient estimates: percent-
age of non-Hispanic white population, and percentage of bachelor degree or higher
population. This suggests that these two factors are affecting MAPD enrollments
and PDP enrollments in the same direction. Fourteen variables have opposite signs
in the coefficients for MAPD and PDP plan penetration. Nine factors that have
positive effects on PDP penetration rates but negative effects on MAPD penetra-
tion rates are: number of MAPD plans available, average age, percentage of female,
percentage of people eligible for Medicaid, and percentage of people with obstruc-
tive pulmonary/ diabetes/ ischemic heart/ colorectal cancer/ hypertension. While
five factors that are negatively related to PDP enrollments but positively related to
MAPD enrollments include homeownership rate, average HCC score, percentage of
people with kidney disease/high cholesterol/ Alzheimer.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter identifies factors associated with the choice of the Medicare population
between MAPD plans and PDP plans when they receive prescription drug coverage.
The data in the analysis includes high-level census data, plan data and penetration
data. We use beta regression due to the properties of the response variable and
implement the methodology in R. We find that half of the variables have opposite
signs, which means they have impacts on MAPD and PDP plan penetration rates in
different directions. This conclusion can help policy-makers identify which types of
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prescription drug plans for the Medicare population should be emphasized in each
county based on the characteristics of their population from census data and plan
data of the counties.
4.7 Appendix
This appendix includes regression coefficients estimates as well as diagnostic plots
for PDP and total penetration models.
Table 4.6: Parameter estimates - PDP
Parameter Estimate Std. error z value Pr(> |z|) Sig. code
(Intercept) -6.1010 0.2965 -20.5770 0.0000 ***
cnt mapd -0.0120 0.0006 -21.3100 0.0000 ***
cnt pdp 0.0146 0.0024 6.1610 0.0000 ***
Average Age 0.0599 0.0039 15.3470 0.0000 ***
Percent Female 3.1450 0.2649 11.8710 0.0000 ***
Percent Non Hispanic White 0.1928 0.0357 5.3950 0.0000 ***
Bachelor degree or higher perc -0.4200 0.0986 -4.2610 0.0000 ***
Homeownership rate -0.3101 0.0755 -4.1080 0.0000 ***
Per capita money income 0.0000 0.0000 3.5540 0.0004 ***
Persons below poverty level per 0.8545 0.1420 6.0180 0.0000 ***
Percent Eligible for Medicaid 1.5290 0.0916 16.6960 0.0000 ***
Average HCC Score -1.0820 0.1203 -8.9920 0.0000 ***
Percent of kidney disease -0.6899 0.2363 -2.9200 0.0035 **
Percent of obstructive pulmonary 1.1040 0.2215 4.9840 0.0000 ***
Percent of diabetes 1.2640 0.2011 6.2880 0.0000 ***
Percent of ischemic heart 0.8847 0.1246 7.1000 0.0000 ***
Percent of colorectal cancer 5.0150 1.0940 4.5830 0.0000 ***
Percent of prostate cancer 2.1120 0.6920 3.0530 0.0023 **
Percent of asthma -1.8460 0.4575 -4.0350 0.0001 ***
Percent of hypertension 1.0150 0.1466 6.9250 0.0000 ***
Percent of high cholesterol -0.8301 0.1044 -7.9500 0.0000 ***
Percent of alzheimer -1.2590 0.3161 -3.9830 0.0001 ***
Percent of stroke -2.4560 0.6370 -3.8560 0.0001 ***
φ 45.362 1.223 37.09 0.0000 ***
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Figure 4.3: Diagnostic plots of PDP plans
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Table 4.7: Parameter estimates - Total
Parameter Estimate Std. error z value Pr(> |z|) Sig. code
(Intercept) -2.7131 0.2611 -10.3920 0.0000 ***
cnt mapd 0.0039 0.0006 6.9630 0.0000 ***
cnt pdp 0.0107 0.0023 4.7130 0.0000 ***
Average Age 0.0178 0.0036 4.9080 0.0000 ***
Percent Female 2.3613 0.2222 10.6260 0.0000 ***
Percent Non Hispanic White 0.3362 0.0341 9.8450 0.0000 ***
Bachelor degree or higher perc -0.7069 0.0567 -12.4630 0.0000 ***
Persons below poverty level per 0.3744 0.1006 3.7220 0.0002 ***
Percent Eligible for Medicaid 1.5960 0.0878 18.1850 0.0000 ***
Average HCC Score 0.2620 0.0882 2.9720 0.0030 **
Percent of atrial fibrillation 1.7105 0.4143 4.1290 0.0000 ***
Percent of obstructive pulmonary -1.2313 0.1863 -6.6100 0.0000 ***
Percent of colorectal cancer 3.6461 1.0294 3.5420 0.0004 ***
Percent of asthma -2.2510 0.4292 -5.2450 0.0000 ***
Percent of high cholesterol -0.4216 0.0685 -6.1510 0.0000 ***
Percent of stroke -3.4238 0.5715 -5.9910 0.0000 ***
Percent of Beneficiaries Using PB 0.1279 0.0459 2.7880 0.0053 **
φ 63.67 1.72 37.01 0.0000 ***
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Figure 4.4: Diagnostic plots of all Part D plans
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Chapter 5
Analysis of Medicare Services
Usage and Reimbursement Rate
5.1 Introduction
The Medicare program pays healthcare costs for the elderly, the permanently dis-
abled, and those with end-stage renal disease. In 2013, Medicare spending accounted
for 14% of the federal budget as shown in Figure 5.1. It also accounted for 20% of
total national health spending in 2012, 27% of spending on hospital care, and 23%
of spending on physician services. Medicare benefit payments totaled $583 billion in
2013. About 1/4 was for hospital inpatient services, 12% for physician services, and
11% for the Part D drug benefit. Another 1/4 of benefit spending was for Medicare
Advantage private health plans covering all Part A and B benefits. In 2014, 30% of
Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans [44].
CMS (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services) has recently made available
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extensive data files about providers’ utilization profiles, i.e., what they are charging
Medicare for, for each provider, all over the country, for services provided at a facility
or at an office. The objective of this chapter is to get statistical insights about the
health of the Medicare population from the public files. We are interested in answer-
ing the following questions particularly: Are there states with a disproportionate
incidence of a given HCPCS (Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System) code
compared to the size of Medicare population in that state? Are usage disparities
across states driven by differences in Medicare reimbursement amounts?
Figure 5.1: Medicare vs. Federal Budget & Medicare Benefit Payments, 2013
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation [44]
5.2 Data Description
As part of the Obama Administrations efforts to make the healthcare system more
transparent, affordable, and accountable, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Ser-
vices has prepared a public data set, the Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment
Data [41], with information on services and procedures provided to Medicare benefi-
ciaries by physicians and other healthcare professionals. The summary data contains
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aggregated information by state and HCPCS code. Any aggregated records which
are derived from 10 or fewer beneficiaries are excluded to protect the privacy of
Medicare beneficiaries. A total of 8305 HCPCS codes and 880644 physicians in 50
states, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands are included in the data.
The data includes physician services (Part B) only. Medicare Part B beneficiaries
represent about 90 percent of total Medicare population (Part A and Part B). Table
5.1 illustrates the main information provided in the data. We will analyze the data
to get insights on physician services usage and Medicare reimbursement rate. All
data analyses in this chapter are performed in SAS.
Table 5.1: Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data, 2012
Variable Name Description Example
nppes provider state desc The state where the provider is located. Pennsylvania
hcpcs code HCPCS code for the service provided. 67028
hcpcs description Description of the HCPCS code. Injection eye drug
place of service Either a facility (‘F’) or non-facility (‘O’). O
number of providers Number of providers within state. 147
line srvc cnt Number of services provided. 103114
unique bene doctor cnt Number of unique beneficiary/doctor interactions. 25393
bene day srvc cnt Number of distinct Medicare beneficiary/per day services. 102732
average medicare allowed amt Average of the Medicare allowed amount for the service. $119.847719
average submitted chrg amt Average of the charges submitted for the service. $604.2012631
average medicare payment amt Average amount that Medicare paid. $93.4530861
5.3 Correlation Analysis of Services Usage and
Medicare Population/ Reimbursement
We first create an additional column - total dollar amount - by multiplying the
Medicare average allowed amount by the line service count. Then we rank the data
in decreasing order by this column. The top ten HCPCS codes in total dollar amount
are shown in table 2. We notice that the most expensive codes in total dollar amount
are 99214 (office/outpatient visit, medium level of complexity, in an office setting),
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99213 (office/outpatient visit, low level of complexity, in an office setting), and 99232
(subsequent hospital care, in facility).
Table 5.2: Top 10 HCPCS Codes in Total Dollar Allowed Amount
State HCPCS HCPCS Desc Place # of Srvc Avg Allowed Amt Tot Allowed Amt
1 Overall 99214 Office/outpatient visit est O 76,237,819 $103.11 $7,861,014,700
2 Overall 99213 Office/outpatient visit est O 91,252,355 $69.59 $6,350,698,955
3 Overall 99232 Subsequent hospital care F 49,384,357 $69.87 $3,450,330,601
4 Overall 66984 Cataract surg w/iol 1 stage F 3,716,637 $611.76 $2,273,702,288
5 Overall 99223 Initial hospital care F 11,213,325 $195.75 $2,195,032,129
6 Overall 99233 Subsequent hospital care F 21,423,718 $100.73 $2,157,916,561
7 Overall A0427 ALS1-emergency F 4,980,848 $413.56 $2,059,889,581
8 Overall 99285 Emergency dept visit F 10,317,768 $167.62 $1,729,505,516
9 Overall A0428 bls F 6,587,015 $221.67 $1,460,121,921
10 Overall 92014 Eye exam & treatment O 11,217,016 $118.05 $1,324,162,376
We conduct correlation analyses on these three codes to investigate if the inci-
dence of codes per state more strongly correlated with Medicare population, or with
Medicare reimbursement in that state. Table 5.3 shows the Pearson correlation coef-
ficients for code 99214. Service usage and Medicare population are highly correlated
as their correlation is 0.96, with p-value <0.0001. Meanwhile, the correlation between
service usage and Medicare reimbursement is only 0.21, which indicates that services
usage is less correlated with reimbursement rate than population. Same conclusion
can be drawn from the scatter plots as it is close to a straight line in service usage
versus population plot but disperse in service usage versus reimbursement plot.
Table 5.3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for 99214
Variable With Variable N Correlation 95% Confidence Interval p Value
line srvc cnt enrl partb 53 0.96305 [0.935392,0.978209] <.0001
line srvc cnt avg allowed amt 53 0.21008 [-0.065851,0.452958] 0.1316
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Figure 5.2: Scatter Plots of 99214
We can get similar conclusions for code 99213 and code 99232. Their Pearson
correlation coefficients are shown in table 5.4 and table 5.5, respectively.
Table 5.4: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for 99213
Variable With Variable N Correlation 95% Confidence Interval p Value
line srvc cnt enrl partb 53 0.97857 [0.962296,0.987399] <.0001
line srvc cnt avg allowed amt 53 0.22889 [-0.04633,0.468384] 0.0994
Table 5.5: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for 99232
Variable With Variable N Correlation 95% Confidence Interval p Value
line srvc cnt enrl partb 53 0.94172 [0.898962,0.965492] <.0001
line srvc cnt avg allowed amt 53 0.16224 [-0.11455,0.413069] 0.2471
5.4 Most Expensive/Common Services in Each S-
tate
In order to make recommendations to the policy makers which line items to pick
in each state to try to decrease the dollar amount associated by reducing incidence
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numbers (not reimbursement levels), we first identify the most expensive and most
common line items in each state. We take Pennsylvania as an example. The Medicare
population (part B) in Pennsylvania is 2,200,614 in 2012. Per capita is calculated as
total dollar amount divided by Medicare population in PA. The three most expensive
codes in PA are the same as in the United State as a whole, while the rest vary from
their country level counterparts.
Table 5.6: Ten most expensive HCPCS codes in PA
hcpcs code hcpcs description place of srvc total dollar per capita
99214 Office/outpatient visit est O $ 316,631,372 $ 143.88
99213 Office/outpatient visit est O $ 239,046,599 $ 108.63
99232 Subsequent hospital care F $ 188,314,151 $ 85.57
A0428 BLS F $ 97,205,563 $ 44.17
99223 Initial hospital care F $ 95,920,544 $ 43.59
J2778 Ranibizumab injection O $ 89,023,943 $ 40.45
99285 Emergency dept visit F $ 88,333,927 $ 40.14
66984 Cataract surg w/iol 1 stage F $ 85,919,141 $ 39.04
A0427 ALS1-emergency F $ 81,925,077 $ 37.23
99233 Subsequent hospital care F $ 69,563,073 $ 31.61
We do the same calculation for all states and count the frequency a HCPCS code
appearing in the top ten most expensive list of each state. The frequency counts are
shown in table 5.7. For example, code 99213 and 99214 appear in every single state’s
(including Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands) top ten most expensive list. However, for
some codes such as 83898 (Molecule nucleic ampli each) only happens to Utah, not
any other state.
70
Table 5.7: Most expensive HCPCS codes over all states
hcpcs code hcpcs desc place of service cnt state
99213 Office/outpatient visit est O 53
99214 Office/outpatient visit est O 53
99232 Subsequent hospital care F 51
66984 Cataract surg w/iol 1 stage F 49
A0427 ALS1-emergency F 48
99223 Initial hospital care F 43
99285 Emergency dept visit F 40
99233 Subsequent hospital care F 38
92014 Eye exam & treatment O 28
97110 Therapeutic exercises O 18
A0425 Ground mileage F 16
A0428 BLS F 15
J2778 Ranibizumab injection O 13
A0429 BLS-emergency F 10
Table 5.8: Unique most expensive HCPCS codes
hcpcs code hcpcs desc place of service state name
83898 Molecule nucleic ampli each O Utah
83904 Molecule mutation identify O Utah
83909 Nucleic acid high resolute O Utah
83914 Mutation ident ola/sbce/aspe O Washington
90960 Esrd srv 4 visits p mo 20+ O Puerto Rico
97140 Manual therapy O Wyoming
99212 Office/outpatient visit est O Wyoming
99222 Initial hospital care F Michigan
A0430 Fixed wing air transport F Alaska
A0431 Rotary wing air transport F Alabama
A0435 Fixed wing air mileage F Alaska
G9152 Mapcp demo community O Vermont
For the most common HCPCS codes identification, we still take Pennsylvania as
an example, as shown in table 5.9. We rank the data in decreasing order by service
usage. We notice that despite being highest in total dollar amount, code 99214 is
not the highest in terms of service usage.
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Table 5.9: Ten most common HCPCS codes in PA
hcpcs code hcpcs description place of service line srvc cnt
P9603 One-way allow prorated miles O 6,465,047
A0425 Ground mileage F 5,989,114
J0881 Darbepoetin alfa, non-esrd O 3,585,133
99213 Office/outpatient visit est O 3,453,943
99214 Office/outpatient visit est O 3,084,848
99232 Subsequent hospital care F 2,711,119
36415 Routine venipuncture O 2,388,292
97110 Therapeutic exercises O 1,867,715
J1756 Iron sucrose injection O 1,476,971
Q9967 LOCM 300-399mg/ml iodine,1ml O 1,413,515
We identify the most common HCPCS codes over all states in the same fashion as
identifying most expensive ones. We notice that in table 5.10, code 99232 drops from
the third place on the “most expensive” list to the sixth place here, which indicates
that this code is significantly expensive.
Table 5.10: Most common HCPCS codes over all states
hcpcs code hcpcs description place of service cnt state
99213 Office/outpatient visit est O 53
99214 Office/outpatient visit est O 53
A0425 Ground mileage F 53
Q9967 LOCM 300-399mg/ml iodine,1ml O 48
36415 Routine venipuncture O 46
99232 Subsequent hospital care F 40
97110 Therapeutic exercises O 34
J0881 Darbepoetin alfa, non-esrd O 28
P9603 One-way allow prorated miles O 14
85025 Complete cbc w/auto diff wbc O 13
J0878 Daptomycin injection O 13
Q0138 Ferumoxytol, non-esrd O 12
80053 Comprehen metabolic panel O 11
97140 Manual therapy O 11
In the unique most common list (table 5.11), code 83898 (Molecule nucleic ampli
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each) appears again for Utah, which might be an indicator that Utah should focus
more on this code than other states.
Table 5.11: Unique most common HCPCS codes
hcpcs code hcpcs desc place of service state name
66984 Cataract surg w/iol 1 stage O Kentucky
81000 Urinalysis nonauto w/scope O Virgin Islands
83896 Molecular diagnostics O Virginia
83898 Molecule nucleic ampli each O Utah
83901 Molecule nucleic ampli addon O Washington
83904 Molecule mutation identify O Utah
83909 Nucleic acid high resolute O Utah
83914 Mutation ident ola/sbce/aspe O Washington
83925 Assay of opiates O Rhode Island
84443 Assay thyroid stim hormone O Puerto Rico
98940 Chiropractic manipulation O North Dakota
99212 Office/outpatient visit est O Alaska
99231 Subsequent hospital care F Louisiana
G0008 Admin influenza virus vac O Arizona
G9151 Mapcp demo state O Michigan
G9153 Mapcp demo physician O Michigan
J1170 Hydromorphone injection O Mississippi
J1745 Infliximab injection O Montana
J2323 Natalizumab injection O Utah
J3010 Fentanyl citrate injeciton O Mississippi
L8621 Repl zinc air battery O Colorado
Combining information about per capita and number of services, we would rec-
ommend targeting specific line times to decrease total dollar amount by reducing
incidence numbers. For instance, the recommendation for Pennsylvania would be fo-
cusing first on codes 99214, 99213 and 99232 since they have the highest total dollar
amounts and relatively intense service usage.
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Table 5.12: Recommendation for Pennsylvania
hcpcs hcpcs description place per capita line srvc cnt total dollar
P9603 One-way allow prorated miles O $ 0.90 6,465,047 $ 1,981,847
A0425 Ground mileage F $ 20.63 5,989,114 $ 45,392,499
J0881 Darbepoetin alfa, non-esrd O $ 5.33 3,585,133 $ 11,725,185
99213 Office/outpatient visit est O $ 108.63 3,453,943 $ 239,046,599
99214 Office/outpatient visit est O $ 143.88 3,084,848 $ 316,631,372
99232 Subsequent hospital care F $ 85.57 2,711,119 $ 188,314,151
36415 Routine venipuncture O $ 3.26 2,388,292 $ 7,164,785
97110 Therapeutic exercises O $ 23.98 1,867,715 $ 52,762,284
J1756 Iron sucrose injection O $ 0.20 1,476,971 $ 435,796
Q9967 LOCM 300-399mg/ml iodine,1ml O $ 0.09 1,413,515 $ 193,339
5.5 Services and States Most Related to Medicare
Reimbursement
There is concern that doctors and hospitals tend to upcode on purpose to get more
reimbursement from Medicare [70]. To investigate whether this concern is valid or
not, we analyze the correlation between service codes and Medicare reimbursement
over all states. For service codes, we analyze the top 1000 codes in total dollar
amount as it is cost efficient. Service usage is surprisingly not highly correlated with
reimbursement. Among 1000 codes, only 9 of them have correlation higher than
0.7 and 7 of them higher than 0.5 but lower than 0.7. Some of the most highly
correlated codes are shown in table 5.13. The concern is valid since it does exist that
some expensive codes are more often used than others. Medicare could pay more
attention to these codes to prevent upcoding.
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Table 5.13: Services most related to Medicare reimbursement
hcpcs code hcpcs description place of service correlation
89240 Pathology lab procedure O 1
0182T Hdr elect brachytherapy O 0.983123
84999 Clinical chemistry test O 0.870835
G0249 Provide INR test mater/equip O 0.836478
86849 Immunology procedure O 0.741178
We do a similar analysis on the codes at state level. The results show that service
usage doesn’t seem to be correlated to the Medicare allowed reimbursement on state
level as even the most significant correlation between number of services and allowed
amount is only -0.08. This means that no state particularly upcodes.
5.6 Simulation of Project Growth in Usage and
Spending
Our objective in this section is to project growth in service usage and spending in
ten years. We get the total number of Medicare beneficiaries by state from CM-
S’s Medicare Enrollment Reports [40] and Kaiser Family Foundation’s State Health
Facts [43] due to lack of partial data from CMS’s enrollment database. Then we
perform a simulation about the projected growth in line item counts (service usage)
based on growth in Medicare population for each state in ten years. We predict
Medicare spending in ten years as well assuming Medicare reimbursement rates grow
at inflation rate. The steps of the prediction process is as follows:
1. Perform time series analysis on Medicare population of each state from 1999 to
2012, and project Medicare population in ten years based on the growth rates
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in each state. We choose ARIMA models because they are, in theory, the most
general class of models for forecasting a time series.
2. Analyze relationship between service usage and Medicare population using lin-
ear regression, and predict growth in service usage based on the linear model.
We could also use nonlinear regression, such as Support Vector Machine re-
gression or Neural Network regression.
3. Predict Medicare spending in ten years based on projected growth in service
usages and the assumption that reimbursement rates increasing at inflation
rate.
We plot the Medicare population for all states from 1985 to 2012. Almost all states’
Medicare population grow steadily over years, except the District of Columbia. The
figures below show the Medicare population growth trend for Pennsylvania and U.S.
as a whole.
Figure 5.3: US Medicare Population, 1985-2012
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Figure 5.4: PA Medicare Population, 1985-2012
We take PA as an example showing how time series analysis works on population
growth projection. In order to decide which time series model to apply on PA
population data, we first check autocorrelation of the series.
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Figure 5.5: Autocorrelation check PA
This series is obviously nonstationary as it has a strong upward trend. Its ACF
decays slowly and its PACF only has one spike at lag 1. This is an indicator that
AR(1) model might be adequate for the data. Thus, we difference the data once,
and the total number of observations drops from 28 to 27 since one data is lost in
the differencing process.
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Figure 5.6: Autocorrelation check PA(1)
The time series looks stationary now after differenced once. Thus, AR(1) is
adequate for our PA time series data. We apply AR(1) model on the data and
forecast the Medicare population in PA in ten years. The forecasts are shown in
table 5.14.
Table 5.14: Forecasts for Medicare population in PA
Year Forecast Std Error 95% Confidence Limits
2013 2381386 14596.31 [2352778, 2409994]
2014 2404455 23542.82 [2358312, 2450598]
2015 2425464 30570.45 [2365547, 2485381]
2016 2445926 36408.4 [2374567 , 2517285]
2017 2466243 41466.43 [2384970, 2547515]
2018 2486521 45979.6 [2396402, 2576639]
2019 2506789 50089.78 [2408614, 2604963]
2020 2527054 53887.86 [2421436 , 2632672]
2021 2547318 57435.46 [2434747 , 2659890]
2022 2567583 60776.36 [2448463, 2686702]
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We compare the actual Medicare population (blue) and predicted Medicare pop-
ulation (red). The model seems to fit well. According to the forecast, the Medicare
population in PA in ten years would be 2,567,583.
Figure 5.7: Actual vs. Predicted
We apply linear regression on service usage of code 99214 and Medicare popula-
tion in PA. The R-squared ratio is 0.9275, which is very good. Thus, the projected
service usage of code 99214 would be 4,272,833 in ten years. The current service
usage of code 99214 is 3,084,848. We can then get the projected spending on this
code by multiplying the projected service usage by reimbursement rate, assuming
reimbursement rate increases at inflation rate. The current average medicare reim-
bursement allowed amount for code 99214 in PA is $102.64. If the inflation rate is
2%, then the Medicare spending on this code in PA would be $534,606,556 in ten
years. We can apply the same methods and get projections for all codes and all
states.
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5.7 Conclusions
This chapter investigates trends in physician services usage and Medicare reimburse-
ment rate from CMS public files. We analyze the HCPCS (Healthcare Common
Procedure Coding System) codes and investigate the validity of the concern that
doctors tend to upcode on purpose for more reimbursement. Our findings indicate
that services usage is more correlated with population than reimbursement rate, and
no state particularly upcodes. In addition, we make recommendations to policy mak-
ers on which HCPCS codes to choose for the purpose of reducing Medicare spending.
For example, the recommendation for Pennsylvania would be focusing first on codes
99214 (office/outpatient visit, medium level of complexity, in an office setting), 99213
(office/outpatient visit, low level of complexity, in an office setting), and 99232 (sub-
sequent hospital care, in facility) since they have the highest total dollar amounts
and relatively intense service usage. We also utilize time series analysis to predict
Medicare spending in ten years.
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Chapter 6
Robust optimization in Healthcare
Systems Engineering - A survey
6.1 Overview of Healthcare Systems in the United
States
6.1.1 The Payment System
According to CMS’s data [6], U.S. health care spending increased 3.7 percent to
reach $2.8 trillion in 2012, an average of $8,915 per person, the fourth consecutive
year of slow growth. The share of the economy devoted to health spending decreased
from 17.3 percent in 2011 to 17.2 percent in 2012, as the Gross Domestic Product
increased nearly one percentage point faster than health care spending at 4.6 percent.
Figure 6.1 shows that from 1960 to 2012, the National Health Expenditures and Per
Capita Amount have been consistently growing at unsustainable rates over time.
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The percentage of GDP devoted to health spending increased rapidly from 1960
to 2000, but has been growing slowly from 2000 to 2009. It even decreased by
0.1 percent every year since 2010. The chart in the lower right corner shows the
distribution of US health care expenditures. The x-axis is the percent of population
ranked by health care spending, and the y-axis is the percent of total health care
spending. For example, the top 1 percent of patients account for 21.8 percent of
total health care spending, and the top 50 percent of patients create 97.1 percent of
health expenditures in 2009.
Health care spending is total payments from all sources, including direct payments
from individuals and families, private insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, and miscella-
neous other sources, to hospitals, physicians, other providers (including dental care),
and pharmacies. Health insurance premiums are not included.
Figure 6.1: National Health Expenditures
Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditure Data
In current fee-for-service model, fee-for-service refers to the payment model where
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health care providers receive a fee for each service such as an office visit, test, pro-
cedure, or other health care service. Payments are issued retrospectively, after the
services are provided. Fee-for-service is the dominant physician payment method in
the United States and Laugesen believes that [59]this mechanism is the major driver
of high health care costs. Under this payment model, providers do not take risks since
they get reimbursement for the services they provide. Therefore, it provides incentive
for the provider to increase volume whether appropriate or not, without any risk. It
also encourages duplication, discourages care coordination, and promotes inefficiency
in the health care delivery system [69]. Similarly, when patients are shielded from
paying (cost-sharing) by health insurance coverage, they are incentivized to welcome
any medical service that might do some good. A variety of reform efforts have been
attempted, recommended, or initiated to reduce its influence such as moving toward-
s bundled payments and capitation. Despite all the criticism fee-for-service model
gets, Ginsburg [48] believes that the core method of payment to many physicians for
the services they provide is likely to remain fee-for-service, therefore it is critical to
address the current shortcomings in the Medicare physician fee schedule.
Another payment approach is called capitation or global capitation. Under global
capitation, provider is paid a set amount of money per patient per month, indepen-
dently of the costs actually incurred. It usually pays a single health care organization.
Global capitation is currently used by private HMOs, including in publicly financed
products like Medicare Advantage plans and Medicaid managed care plans. If a
patient insured through a globally capitated plan uses services that cost less than
the amount paid to the provider organization, the organization keeps the leftover
funds as profit. To ensure providers do not withhold needed care, globally capitated
providers often have to report on quality and utilization measures, which can be
linked to performance bonuses or publicly reported [10]. The amount of the global
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payment can be based on normative standards (e.g., the average risk-adjusted pay-
ment for the population in the community) or based on historical spending for the
population cared for by the capitated organization, trended forward. Global capita-
tion encourages providers to improve efficiency of care, reduce unnecessary care and
bring spending under control. In addition, unlike episode-based payments, capitation
provides incentives to keep patients healthy, not just to limit the costs of episodes
when they occur [4]. Physicians can also provide services to patients in various ways
such as phone consultations that can improve efficiency but are difficult to incor-
porate into fee-for-service models. However, providers have to bear full risk beyond
capitated payment.
Many of the payment plans used to pay health care providers in today’s envi-
ronment could be classified as bundled-services arrangements [26] or episode-based
payments. From the perspective of CMS and other private payers, the goal of bun-
dled payments is to improve care coordination and reduce the use of duplicative or
unnecessary services [63]. The payments are designed to achieve this goal by cre-
ating financial incentives for hospitals and affiliated providers to keep the costs of
surgical and acute care episodes below certain amount. Bundled payment introduces
an incentive for providers to select lower-price treatment regimens from among those
deemed equally appropriate - an incentive not present in the current fee-for-service
system. A bundled-services payment plan has two key features. First, payments to
the provider are not necessarily related to the list of specific services provided the pa-
tient and identified in the UB-92 or the CMS-1500. Instead payment is grouped into
a mutually exclusive set of services categories. For example, hospitals are paid by
some health care plans on a per-diem or per-case payment rate. Both are examples
of bundled services payment. Second, bundled-services arrangements have a fixed
fee specified per unit of service. For example, in the per diem arrangement, revenue
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from treating a patient would be equal to the length of stay times the negotiated per-
diem rate. Medicare has developed bundled-services payment plans for most health
care providers. Medicare pays hospitals for inpatient care on a bundled-services unit
basis referred to as PPS (Prospective Payment System). Medicare officially launched
PPS on October 1, 1983. All participating in the Medicare program are required to
participate in PPS, except those excluded by statute. PPS provides payment for all
hospital non-physician services provided to hospital inpatients. This payment also
covers services provided by outside suppliers, such as laboratory or radiology units.
The basis of PPS payment is the DRG system developed by Yale University. The
DRG system takes all possible diagnoses from the International Classification of Dis-
eases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) system and classifies them
into 25 major diagnostic categories based on organ systems. These 25 categories
are further broken down into 559 distinct medically meaningful groupings or DRGs.
Medicare contends that the resources required to treat a given DRG entity should
be similar for all patients within a DRG category.
For hospitals that have higher costs across procedures might face substantial fi-
nancial burden with bundled payments. On the other hand, those hospitals that
have low costs of services would find bundled payment favorable to keep financially
viable. Miller et al. [63] use multiple linear regression to describe hospital-level vari-
ation in Medicare payments for inpatient surgery. Their findings of the existence of
wide variation in payments imply opportunities for substantial savings for CMS and
other payers. However, the potential savings will depend strongly on the procedures
and services selected for bundled payment programs. They also suggest the possible
mixed effects of bundled payments on providers. For example, hospitals that are
currently low cost for one or more of the services potentially covered by bundled
payments, the payments may equal or exceed current fee-for-service reimbursements.
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In this case, the financial incentive would be weak for these providers to focus on
continued improvements in care coordination and cost efficiency.
In implementation of bundled payment, policy makers need to set base payment
rates for episodes of care and update the rates over time to reflect changes in the
costs of delivering care and the components of care. However, Rosen et al. [66]
conduct analysis on 2003 and 2007 US commercial claims data showing that spending
growth to be highly skewed across episodes. 10 percent of episodes accounted for
82.5 percent of spending growth, and within-episode spending growth ranged from
-75 percent to 323 percent. Therefore, instead of updating the reimbursement rates
uniformly across episodes of care, new approaches need to be developed to address
variations in spending growth.
Consumer-directed health plans (CDHPs) , also known as high-deductible health
plans (HDHPs), are relatively new in origin and became viable alternatives with the
passage of the 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act. They combine two elements. The first element is a health plan, usually a PPO,
that has a high deductible (such as $5,000) and low premiums. The second element is
a special ”savings account” that is used to pay medical bills before the deductible has
been met. The health savings account, similar to an individual retirement account
(IRA), lets people put aside untaxed wages that they may use to cover their out-
of-pocket medical expenses. Some employers contribute to employees’ accounts as a
benefit. The primary objective of these plans is to increase the involvement of pa-
tients in selecting cost-effective health care services. In 2009, the median deductible
for individual coverage in a high deductible health plan was $1600, compared with
$400 for traditional deductible health plans [20]. For 2011, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vices (IRS) has set the minimum HDHP deductibles at $1200 for individual coverage
and $2400 for family coverage. Most of the large health plans provide CDHP options,
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but current enrollment in CDHPs still remains small. There is mixed effect of HDHPs
on the utilization of care among patients enrolled in these plans. Wharam [85] an-
alyze emergency department (ED) visits and hospitalizations over two years among
enrollees insured in high-deductible plans through small employers in Massachusetts.
They find that people of high socioeconomic status enrolled in high-deductible health
plans did cut their use of emergency department visits for lower-severity conditions
by 15-20%, with appropriate use of emergency care for serious conditions unchanged.
However, people of low socioeconomic status experienced 25-30 percent reductions in
high-severity ED visits over both years, while hospitalizations declined by 23 percent
in year 1 but rose again in year 2, suggesting that delayed care led to even more
serious illness requiring hospitalization. They suggest that policy makers and em-
ployers should consider proactive strategies to educate high-deductible plan members
about their benefit structures or identify members at higher risk of avoiding needed
care. They should also consider implementing means-based deductibles. Kozhiman-
nil et al. [56] found similar disparities according to gender, with men enrolled in
high-deductible plans more likely than women to forego needed care,which implies
that clinicians caring for patients with HDHPs should be aware of sex differences in
response to benefit design.
6.1.2 The Delivery System
In the healthcare delivery system, health services can be classified into three types:
primary care, secondary care, and tertiary care. Primary care is preventive and
wellness care, provided by physicians, or nurse practitioners. The goal of primary
care is to decrease the health risk of individuals and the community. Usually, the
physician or the nurse practitioner is the first person a patient would reach out to
regarding any health issue. Secondary care is provided by a hospital or specialist,
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referred by the primary care provider, that has more specialized knowledge, skill,
or equipment. Tertiary care refers to more specialized and advanced consultative
heath care, such as cancer management and plastic surgery, referred by primary care
provider or secondary care provider.
The healthcare delivery system in the United States has been highly complicated
and costly, and an Integrated Delivery System (IDS) has been attractive to all players
in the system. IDS is a fairly broad concept. One definition of IDS is that “It is
a network of health care providers and organizations which provides or arranges to
provide a coordinated continuum of services to a defined population and is willing to
be held clinically and fiscally accountable for the clinical outcomes and health status
of the population served” [83].It is believed that higher level of integration will yield
a more efficient healthcare delivery system. A variety of reform efforts under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act have been attempted, recommended, or
initiated to reduce costs and improve quality of care. These include Partnership for
Patients, Bundled Payments for Care Improvement, Comprehensive Primary Care
Initiative, Accountable Care Organization Models, etc. Among them, Accountable
Care Organizations, or ACOs, are groups of doctors, hospitals, and other health
care providers, who come together voluntarily to give coordinated high quality care
to the Medicare patients they serve. ACOs can be considered as a higher-level
system based on IDSs. The goal of ACOs is to avoid unnecessary spending such as
repeated diagnostic tests. ACOs also take responsibility of keeping the patients out
of the hospital and emergency room and helping patients manage their conditions
by getting them to take their medications appropriately and coming back for needed
appointments. ACO is set up by providers, not an insurance company, so the doctors
and hospitals can work within their own framework as long as they are meeting the
33 quality measures and outcomes agreed to the contract with the insurer. Doctors
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and hospitals in ACOs are given a spending target for patient care with requirement
on health care quality standards. They can keep some of the savings if they spend
less than the budget, but will be penalized if they spend too much. There are 626
ACOs in the United States as of May 2014, both in public and private sectors.
Hwang et.al [54] review 25 related articles and manuscripts, and conclude an
association between increased integration in healthcare delivery and an increase in
the quality of care, in terms of clinical effectiveness, length of stay, medication errors,
and number of office visits. As of cost reduction, some studies show that IDSs are
associated with lower cost of care with level of service utilization being used as a
proxy measure for cost of care, while other studies show no significant relationship
between care integration/coordination and cost reduction.
6.2 Introduction to Robust Optimization
Traditional methods to address uncertainty in optimization are stochastic program-
ming and dynamic programming. Stochastic programming assumes the parameters
are uncertain but their distributions are known. A stochastic programming problem
minimizes (or maximizes) the expected objective value over all possible scenarios
caused by the uncertainties that follow certain distributions. Dynamic programming
deals with multi-stage decision making, in which the value function is maximized
such that the decision is optimal at all time periods (also called the optimal poli-
cy). However, stochastic programming and dynamic programming have two major
drawbacks. First, the probability distribution of uncertainty is hard to be estimated
accurately. Further, the size of the problem grows exponentially as the number of
scenarios (for SP) or the number of states/time periods (for DP) increases, which
makes problem solving very difficult or intractable.
90
Robust optimization (RO) comes in as another approach to address data un-
certainty, in which uncertainty is not stochastic, but deterministic and set-based.
Instead of minimize/maximize expected objective value as in SP, RO considers the
worst-case scenario and minimize the maximum objective value or maximize the
minimum objective value over the uncertainty set. Therefore, the optimal solution
of RO is immune to data uncertainty since it guarantees that the optimal solution
is feasible and efficient for any realization of the uncertainty set. Another advantage
of RO is its tractability. Bertsimas et. al [13] state that “many well-known class-
es of optimization problems, including LP, QCQP, SOCP, SDP, and some discrete
problems as well, have an RO formulation that is tractable”.
A simple example of RO is as follows. Consider the linear programming problem:
max c′x
s.t. Ax ≤ b
x ≥ 0
(6.1)
Suppose A is the uncertain parameter and belongs to the uncertainty set U , then
the robust counterpart of Problem(6.1) is
max c′x
s.t. a′ix ≤ bi, ∀i,∀ai ∈ U
x ≥ 0
(6.2)
or equivalently
max c′x
s.t. max
ai∈U
a′ix ≤ bi, ∀i
x ≥ 0
(6.3)
where ai is the ith column of matrix A
′. The uncertainty can be modeled in different
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ways. Soyster [73] considers the linear programming problem where the uncertain-
ty belongs to column-wise convex sets. This method is too conservative since the
optimal solution requires all uncertain parameters to be equal to their worst-case
values. A less conservative approach proposed by Ben-Tal and Nemirovski [11] con-
siders linear programming problem with ellipsoidal uncertainty sets, and the robust
counterpart problem is turned into tractable conic quadratic problem. One drawback
of this method is its nonlinear model structure with higher computational demand-
s. Bertsimas and Sim [15] define uncertainty set as a polyhedron, which consists
of range forecasts for each uncertain parameter. The robust counterpart of the lin-
ear problem is proved to be linear as well. In addition, they introduce a constraint
called “budget of uncertainty”, to control the conservatism at the will of decision
maker. Suppose the uncertain parameter aij belongs to a symmetric, bounded inter-
val [a¯ij − aˆij] where a¯ij is the point forecast of aij and aˆij is the deviation from the
nominal value. Define the scaled deviation yij as
yij =
aij − a¯ij
aˆij
,∀i, j (6.4)
such that aij = a¯ij + aˆijyij. The scaled deviation y belongs to the set:
Y =
{
y|
n∑
j=1
|yij| ≤ Γi,∀i, |yij| ≤ 1,∀i, j
}
, (6.5)
where Γ ∈ [0, n] is the budge of uncertainty, which determines the number of aij that
can be deviated from the nominal value a¯ij. If Γ = 0, then all parameters are certain.
If Γ = n, then all parameters are uncertain. If 0 < Γ < n, then the decision maker
can control the level of conservatism while protect against parameter uncertainty to
some degree. By incorporating the budge of uncertainty constraint, Problem (6.1)
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becomes:
max c′x
s.t. a¯i
′x+ max
yi∈Y
n∑
j=1
aˆij
′xjyij ≤ bi, ∀i
x ≥ 0.
(6.6)
The robust problem (6.6) can be reformulated as a linear programming problem [16]:
max c′x
s.t. a¯i
′x− Γipi −
n∑
j=1
qij ≤ bi, ∀i
pi + qij ≤ aˆijzj, ∀i, j
−zj ≤ xj ≤ zj, ∀j
pi, qij ≥ 0, ∀i, j
x ≥ 0.
(6.7)
The reader is referred to Bertsimas et. al [13], Gabrel et. al [46] and references
therein for a comprehensive review on theories, applications and recent advances of
robust optimization.
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6.3 Applications of Robust Optimization in Health-
care Systems Engineering
6.3.1 Robust Regression and Prediction of Healthcare Costs
Robust Regression
Ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression can be very sensitive to outliers due
to various assumptions of the model such as residuals having constant variance and
are normally iid (independent and identically distributed). Robust regression is an
alternative estimation method which down-weight or ignore unusual data such that
it can still provide useful information when some of the assumptions are violated.
When the weights given to each observations are close to one, the results of robust
regression would be the same as OLS estimates. There are different types of robust
regression models when it comes to how they give less weights to observations that
would otherwise influence regression line. Some commonly used estimators include
M-estimators, bounded-influence estimators, MM-estimators, and L1-regression esti-
mators. Robust regression can be implemented in SAS (”ROBUSTREG” procedure)
and R (”robust” package).
M-Estimation: “M”-Estimation gets its name since it is considered as a gen-
eralization of the Maximum Likelihood Estimation method. It is first introduced
by Peter J. Huber in 1964. M-estimation deals with outliers in the way that gives
less weights to observations with large residuals [45]. An objective function f and a
weight function w are involved in the estimation process. Consider a linear model
yi = x
T
i β + i, i = 1, . . . , n, (6.8)
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then the residual would be
ei = yi − yˆi = yi − xTi βˆ. (6.9)
In regression estimation, the estimates βˆ are obtained by minimizing the objective
function
n∑
i=1
f(ei) =
n∑
i=1
f(yi − xTi βˆ). (6.10)
Intuitively, the minimization problem 6.10 can be solved by differentiating with re-
spect to βˆ and setting it to 0:
∂
∂b
n∑
i=1
f(yi − xTi βˆ) = 0. (6.11)
If we define the weight function w as the derivative of f with respect to βˆ, then
equation 6.11 becomes
n∑
i=1
wi(yi − xTi βˆ)xTi = 0. (6.12)
Since weights w, coefficients β, and residuals e depend on each other, the minimiza-
tion problem 6.10 can be solved by an iterative method until the estimated coeffi-
cients converge. For the traditional OLS method, the objective function f(e) = e2
represents sum of squared residuals, and the weight function w(e) = 1 since it gives
equal weight to every observation. However, for M-estimation, one possible objective
function (Huber Method) and its corresponding weight function are:
f(e) =

1
2
e2, |e| ≤ c
c|e| − 1
2
c2 |e| > c
,w(e) =

1, |e| ≤ c
c/|e| |e| > c
(6.13)
Bounded-influence estimation: Although M-estimators are insensitive to out-
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liers and have relatively high efficiency, they are not robust to high leverage points
under certain circumstances. Therefore, bounded-influence (BI) estimators are used
to deal with high leverage points. One example is the least-trimmed squares (LTS) es-
timator, in which the estimates βˆ are obtained by minimizing the sum of the smallest
k of squared residuals. However, how to choose k can be tricky and they sometimes
provide unreasonable results. Therefore, one estimation method which combines M-
estimation and Bounded-Influence estimation is called MM-estimation, where the BI
estimator provide starting points for M-estimation. This method takes advantage of
M-estimation’s high efficiency and BI estimation’s high breakdown point.
L1 regression: It is the most commonly used method of robust regression. As
a special case of quantile regression, L1 regression minimizes the sum of absolute
residuals:
βˆ = arg min
1
n
n∑
i=1
|yi − xTi β|. (6.14)
Compared with OLS method, L1 gives much less weight to observations with large
residuals. Instead of estimating mean of response variable y at xTβ, L1 regression
estimates median of y at xTβ.
Note that here we only consider robustness to outliers, not other types of ro-
bustness such as model misspecification. Minimax robust designs for misspecified
regression models is proposed and illustrated by Heo et.al [53]and Shi et.al [71]. Ro-
bust regression could possibly be confused with Robust optimization in statistical
estimation [47] [24], which assumes the coefficient matrices A and b are uncertain
but bounded. For the purpose of healthcare costs prediction, we do not consider this
type of robustness either.
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Application: Prediction of Healthcare Costs
Healthcare costs have been growing at unsustainable rates these years. National
health spending grew 3.6% in 2013. Thus healthcare cost prediction plays an impor-
tant role in improving accountability in care. To take a closer look at the distribution
of health spending, the cut-off points representing the annual expenses per person in
each percentile are shown in the table below. For instance, almost half of all health
care spending (49.5%) was used to treat just 5% of the population, which included
individuals with health expenses at or above $17,402 per year. We plot health spend-
ing versus percent of population and find that it obeys power-law distribution. The
distribution of health spending is highly concentrated because the onset of disease is
unpredictable and can require intensive technology and time to treat.
Figure 6.2: Cut-Off Points of NHE Figure 6.3: Distribution of NHE
Researchers have been using statistical models to better predict healthcare costs.
Claims data and administrative data are two major utilized data sources. According
to Duncan [34], there are two major types of models for healthcare costs prediction.
One type is non-condition risk-based models. The other type is risk factor-based
models. The non-condition risk-based models are mostly used for pricing, under-
writing and candidates selection for care management programs. They use age/sex
only, prior cost only, or combination of these two predictors. For the age/sex only
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model, relative factor ratios are created and multiplied by baseline health costs to
predict future cost of an individual or a group of individuals. For the prior cost only
model, experience trend factor is multiplied by baseline PMPY (per member per
year) when calculating subsequent year predicted cost. For the combination model,
the expected cost is calculated as the weighted sum of prior cost and age/sex rating.
The combination model produces more accurate predictions than individual models.
The accuracy of all three models improves as the size of group increases. The pri-
or cost model is more accurate when groups have outlier members who have extra
claims. Since non-condition risk-based models use very limited information about
individual risk factors, their predictions are less accurate than models incorporating
additional individual risk factors. Risk factor-based models utilize factors such as
medical condition related factors and life style related factors, besides age and gen-
der. Common statistical methods that risk factor-based models are built on include
regression, classification trees, and clustering algorithm.
Most literature use regression models to analyze and predict healthcare costs. In
Gregori et. al’s review [51], different models are designed to match the characteristics
of healthcare costs. To address the high skewness of the distribution of healthcare
costs, three methods are widely used: (1) OLS on transformed response variable,
which may cause interpretation problems during back transformation; (2) Threshold
model, which estimates the probabilities that the costs are greater than the median
and the third quantile, thus does not give an estimate of the mean; (3) Generalized
Linear Model (GLM), which transform the expectation instead of response variable
itself, thus is a flexible approach. To address the mass at zero costs, the most popular
methods are: (1) Add a positive constant to the costs, which performs poorly as the
choice of the constant is tricky and it does not take into account the differences
between “true” positive costs and “fake” positive costs; (2) Tobit model, which
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introduces a new binary variable with value 1 when c > 0 and with value 0 when
c ≤ 0; (3) Mixed model, in which the conditional expectation is
E(ci|x) = p(ci > 0)E(ci|ci > 0). (6.15)
Classification and clustering algorithms are also being used to predict healthcare
cost buckets. Bertsimas et. al [12] utilize data mining techniques on claims data
from over 800,000 insured individuals over three years. They divide the learning
sample into five cost buckets and apply decision trees and clustering algorithms to
predict the median dollar amount of healthcare costs. The baseline method is to
simply use last 12 months of observation period as forecast of overall healthcare cost
in the next period. They validate their models using over 200,000 out-of-sample
members. The independent variables include diagnosis groups, procedure groups,
drug groups, cost variables, age and gender etc. The performance measures are the
hit ratio, the penalty error, and the absolute prediction error. They findings are:
(1) classification tree algorithm does a bit better on lowest-cost buckets for the hit
ratio and penalty error, but the clustering algorithm performs better on the higher-
cost buckets; (2) the pattern of past cost data is a strong predictor of future costs;
(3) medical information only contributes to accurate prediction of medical costs of
high-cost members. To improve the classification trees used by Bertsimas, random
forests can be utilized since random forests is ”unexcelled in accuracy among current
algorithms and runs efficiently on large data bases.” Random forests is an ensemble
model of classification trees. There are two sources of ”randomness” in the model:
(1)randomly sample N data points with replacement from original dataset as training
set for tree growing; (2)m variables out of M input variables are randomly selected
and are used to best split the node. Advantages of random forests include: (1)It
does not overfit; (2)There is no need for cross-validation or a separate test set to get
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an unbiased estimate of the test set error. It is estimated internally during the run.
Random forests is particularly suitable for imbalanced data as healthcare cost data.
No literature is found in healthcare costs prediction using random forests.
In addition to regression and classification/clustering methods, time series analy-
sis is utilized by Vliet [82], who uses healthcare expenditure and insurance coverage
data of about 35,000 members enrolled with the largest private health insurer in the
Netherlands to estimate an upper bound on the proportion of variance in annual
individual healthcare expenditures. The results show that at most 20 percent of the
variance is predictable. Vliet’s study considers four time series models: VC (Variance
Components) model, AR (AutoRegressive) model, ARVC (AutoRegressive-Variance
Components) model, and ARMA (AutoRegressive-Moving Averages) model.
Robust regression can be applied in prediction of healthcare costs due to the
heavy-tailed distribution of healthcare costs. Literature in this application is rela-
tively limited. Szpiro et.al [80] present a new Bayesian approach to model-robust
linear regression which leads to uncertainty estimates with the same robustness prop-
erties as the Huber-White sandwich estimator. They study the relationship between
average annual outpatient healthcare costs and age using data from Washington State
Basic Health Plan. Robust regression is proved to perform well with high accuracy
and low MAPE (Mean Absolute Percentage Error) [57] [62].
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6.3.2 Robust Markov Decision Processes and Disease Man-
agement
Robust Markov Decision Process
Markov Decision Processes (MDP) is a powerful tool for sequential decision making
under uncertainty. It is a higher-level decision tree model which addresses more com-
plicated problems and utilizes more advances modeling techniques. As an extension
of Markov chains, it differentiates with respect to multiple options in actions and
rewards. It has been applied in many medical treatment decision making problems,
such as epidemic control, drug infusion, kidney/liver transplantation, treatment of
ischemic heart disease, etc [68]. There are two ways to classify MDP. It may be
classified into discrete-time, where decisions are made at discrete time intervals or
continuous-time MDP, where decisions can be made at any time. It could also be
classified into finite-horizon or infinite-horizon MDP according to the time horizon
in which the decisions are made [9].
All MDPs have five basic components: (1) T : the set of points in time when
decisions are made (discrete interval vs. continuous interval); (2) S: the set of all
possible states the system could be at; (3) A: the set of possible actions that the
decision maker could take for each state; (4) pt(s
′|s, a): the transition probability
that action a in state s at time t will lead to state s′ at time t + 1; (5) rt(s, a):
the expected immediate reward by taking action a at state s. A discount factor
γ ∈ [0, 1] is often present in MDPS when future rewards are discounted over time.
For instance, γ =
1
1 + r
if the discount rate is r.
The problem of MDPs is to find an optimal policy pi that maximizes a measure
of rewards, which is typically the expected discounted sum of rewards over a finite or
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infinite horizon. We introduce briefly the problems and algorithms of discrete-time
and continuous-time MDPs. The object function of discrete-time MDP is:
max
at∈A
∞∑
t=0
γtrt(s, a) (6.16)
where 0 ≤ γ < 1, and the maximum value is obtained when at = pi(st). Discrete
MDPs can be solved by linear programming or dynamic programming. Two most
commonly used variants of dynamic programming are value iteration and policy
iteration. The value iteration method solves Bellman equations iteratively backwards
in time:
y∗T (sT ) = rT (sT ) ∀sT ∈ S, (6.17)
y∗t (st) = max
a∈A
{
rt(st, a) + γ
∑
i∈S
pt(i|st, a)y∗t+1(i)
}
, t = 1, · · · , T, st ∈ S (6.18)
where y∗T (sT ) denotes the terminal reward at time T when the state is sT , and y
∗
t (st)
represents the optimal value of total expected reward when the state at time t is s.
The optimal policy is comprised of optimal actions a∗st,t given by equation (6.19).
a∗st,t ∈ arg max
a∈As
{
rt(st, a) + γ
∑
i∈S
pt(i|st, a)y∗t+1(i)
}
, t = 1, · · · , T (6.19)
The policy iteration method is quite different since it initializes the process by
choosing an arbitrary policy pi. The next step is policy evaluation, where the total
expected reward is calculated by solving a set of linear equations under the chosen
arbitrary policy. Followed by policy evaluation is policy improvement, where a bet-
ter policy is obtained and updated for each state s under the assumption that the
arbitrary policy is used for the next step onwards. This process is repeated until pi
does not change any more or converges.
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The formulation of the linear programming problem for MDP, where y∗(s) for
every state s are variables, is [52]:
min
∑
s
y∗(s)
s.t. y∗(s)− rt(st, a)− γ
∑
i∈S
pt(i|st, a)y∗t+1(i) ≥ 0, ∀s, a.
(6.20)
The optimal solution of Problem (6.20) can be obtained by solving its dual program.
For continuous-time MDP, the objective function becomes:
max
a(t)∈A
E[
∫ ∞
0
γtr(s(t), a(t))dt]. (6.21)
Continuous-time MDPs can be solved in similar algorithms as discrete-time MDPs,
and are omitted here.
In practice, the transition probabilities and the reward parameters in the above
MDP models and algorithms are either estimated from historical data or learned
from experience. However, it is hard to get access to enough historical data or to
accurately estimate the parameters, which may lead to significant difference between
long-term performance of a strategy and the model’s prediction [32]. Therefore,
robust optimization comes in to incorporate the uncertainty in MDPs, thus called
robust MDPs. Current literature on robust MDPs can be classified in two ways:
classification based on type of objective function, and classification based on type
of uncertainty source. With respect to the objective function, one type of robust
MDPs maximizes the value function under worst case scenario, and the other type
minimizes the maximum regret. With respect to uncertainty source, some studies fo-
cus on uncertain transition matrix P , while other studies focus on uncertain reward
R. Wiesemann et.al [86] derive rectangular uncertainty sets for transition matri-
ces P with pre-specified probability 1 − β from historical data. They assume that
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the transition samples are not independent for each state-action pair, and consid-
er both rectangular and non-rectangular uncertainty sets. The optimal policy that
achieves maximum value under worst-case scenario with rectangular uncertainty set
is obtained by tractable second-order conic programs. However, the robust MDP
involving non-rectangular uncertainty set is intractable, and only approximate so-
lutions can be obtained by semidefinite programming. Nilim and El Ghaoui [64]
argue that polytope set is a poor representation of uncertain transition matrices and
lead to over conservative robust solutions. They propose to model uncertainty vi-
a Kullback-Leibler divergence bounds, and solve finite/infinite robust MDPs using
the “robust dynamic programming” algorithm. The complexity of their algorithm
is almost the same as the original Bellman recursion in dynamic programming, thus
leading to no extra computational costs. Xu and Mannor [90] consider the trade-off
between worst case performance and nominal performance over all models to ad-
dress the over-conservatism of robust MDP models. Their algorithm computes the
trade-off between robustness and performance by optimizing the weighted sum of the
robustness criterion and the performance criterion. The algorithm is also applied to
robust MDPs and it is tractable only for MDPs with uncertain reward parameters,
not for uncertain transition matrices. Ahmed et.al [8] formulate the regret minimiza-
tion problem over possible models of dependent transition and reward uncertainty,
and approximate it as a Mixed Integer Linear Program. The regret for a policy pi
is defined as the difference between the value of optimal policy pi∗ and the value of
policy pi.
Application: Disease Management
Adherence of medication is a very important problem since nonadherence may lead to
serious complications and hospitalization. Since there are probabilities of adherence
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and decisions on how often/long a nurse makes a call are involved, Markov Decision
Process is an option to facilitate the decision making process. Mason et.al [60] use
several MDP models to determine the optimal time of intervention to improve med-
ication adherence, and the MDPs are solved by backwards recursion. They consider
the trade-off between maximum patient adherence and minimum cost of intervention.
They find out that it is cost effective to implement Electronic Health Records-based
active surveillance system for cardiovascular disease management program.
Consider the simple disease management problem where a nurse tracks the medi-
cation adherence of a patient recovering in acute care by weekly phone calls. Suppose
the recovery time for the acute illness is three weeks. At the beginning of the first
week, the nurse makes either a long call or a short call to the patient. After that, at
the end of each week (including the first week), the nurse calls the patient to check
if the patient adhered medication in the previous week or not. And the nurse makes
the decision, based on the result of previous week, on whether to make a long call or
a short call to maintain/improve adherence. We model this problem as a discrete-
time finite MDP, in which time horizon T is 3 weeks; S is either 1 (adherence) or 0
(nonadherence); A is the action the nurse could take which is either making a long
call or a short call; transition probability matrix P describes the probabilities of
adherence after long call and short call; and the reward R is the total cost including
cost of nurse intervention and the cost of hospitalization due to nonadherence. The
objective is to find the optimal policy such that the total cost is minimized:
y∗t (st) = min
a∈A
{
rt(st, a) + γ
∑
i∈S
pt(i|st, a)y∗t+1(i)
}
, t = 1, · · · , T, st ∈ S. (6.22)
The transition probabilities can be obtained by observing historical data. However,
the estimations are subject to error. Therefore, we could construct uncertainty set
for the transition matrix, for instance, a state-wise uncertainty set. Suppose the
105
transition matrix P belongs to the uncertainty set U , then the objective function of
the robust MDP problem becomes:
min
pi
max
P∈U
{
rt(st, a) + γ
∑
i∈S
pt(i|st, a)y∗t+1(i)
}
, t = 1, · · · , T, st ∈ S. (6.23)
The problem can be solved by the robust dynamic programming algorithm (See
Nilim and El Ghaoui [64] for details of the algorithm). For this particular problem,
robust dynamic programming algorithm would be sufficient due to the small size
of the problem. If the size of the problem increases as the number of time periods
goes to a large number, then robust dynamic programming algorithm might not
be as efficient as it is now due to the “curse of dimensionality”. Tamar, Mannor
and Xu [81] propose a robust approximate dynamic programming method based on
a projected fixed point equation to approximately solve large scale robust MDPs.
They demonstrate the effectiveness of their method through simulation of an option
pricing problem.
6.3.3 Robust Linear Programming and IMRT Fluence Map
Optimization
Application: IMRT Fluence Map Optimization
Intensity modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) is one of the advanced cancer treat-
ments that uses external radiation beams to irradiate tumors. The goal of the treat-
ment is to deliver a prescribed amount of radiation to precisely conform to the 3D
shape of the tumor, while sparing the surrounding critical organs and normal tissues.
There are three major optimization problems in IMRT: beam-angle optimization,
fluence map optimization and intensity delivery optimization. Among them, fluence
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map optimization aims to determine the optimal intensity profile of each beam given
a set of predefined radiation beams. The general linear formulations of the fluence
map optimization problem is described in Yih [92]. Let (x, y, z) denote a point in
the three-dimensional treatment volume including target (T),critical organs(O), and
normal tissues(S); (m¯, k) denotes the beamlet k of beam m¯, k = 1, ..., t; v(x,y,z,,m¯,k)
denotes the dose contribution from beamlet (m¯, k). The fluence map optimization
problem can be formulated as a linear programming problem with fluence values
wm¯,k as decision variables:
min f(V(x,y,z))
s.t.
∑
m¯∈M¯
t∑
k=1
wm¯,k · v(x,y,z,,m¯,k) ≤ V(x,y,z)
wm¯,k ≥ 0, ∀m¯ ∈ M¯, k = 1, ..., t
The objective function and constraints can be defined differently. An example of the
objective function is to minimize the sum of total deviation between the delivered
dose and prescribed dose at all points:
f(V(x,y,z)) = ρTf(VT ) + ρOf(VO) + ρSf(VS), (6.24)
where f(VT ),f(VO), and f(VS) are linear functions of decision variable wm¯,k, and
ρT ,ρO and ρS are weighting factors. An example of the constraints limits doses on
points within the tumor target in the interval [Tl, Tu]: Tl ≤ VT ≤ Tu. Another
important constraint is the dose volume constraint, which limits the RELATIVE
volume of a structure that receives more or less than a particular threshold [58].
Various types of uncertainties exist in the IMRT process such as periodic breath-
ing and cardiac motion within a treatment, as well as changes in intra-abdominal
pressure and weight changes over the course of treatment [25]. Common methods
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to address include adding safety margins to targets or using a motion probability
density function to represent dose distribution. Bortfeld et.al [18] proposes a robust
optimization framework to incorporate the uncertainty in breathing motion for lung
tumors. Their robust solution requires about 11% less dose to the healthy tissue
than the margin solution (worst-case scenario), while providing the same level of‘
protection against breathing uncertainty. The patient’s breathing motion is modeled
using a probability mass function(PMF). The breathing motion PMF for a patient
in a particular fraction specifies the proportion of time the patient spends in each
of a finite number of breathing motion states during that fraction. The uncertainty
set is then a set of breathing motion PMF’s that could be realized during treatment.
Let P be the set of all PMF’s on finite set X:
P = {p ∈ R|X||∀x ∈ X, p(x) ≥ 0;
∑
x∈X
p(x) = 1}. (6.25)
Then the PMF uncertainty set would be a bounded polyhedron defined by a lower
bound vector and an upper bound vector:
P = {p ∈ P|∀x ∈ X, p¯(x)− p−(x) ≤ p(x) ≤ p¯(x) + p+(x)}. (6.26)
They define the nominal problem incorporating motion as:
min
w
∑
v∈V
∑
b∈B
∑
x∈X
dv,x,bp(x)wb
s.t.
∑
b∈B
∑
x∈X
dv,x,bp(x)wb ≥ tv,∀v ∈ V
wb ≥ 0,∀b ∈ B,
(6.27)
where dv,x,b describes the dose delivered to voxel v, when the anatomy is in breathing
phase x per unit intensity of beamlet b. Therefore,
∑
x∈X
∑
b∈B
dv,x,bp(x)wb is the sum
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of the doses to voxel v delivered under each breathing motion state weighted by
the corresponding proportions of time spent in those states. By adding the PMF
uncertainty set, the robust counterpart of Problem (6.27) would be:
min
w
∑
v∈V
∑
b∈B
∑
x∈X
dv,x,bp(x)wb
s.t.
∑
b∈B
∑
x∈X
dv,x,bp˜(x)wb ≥ tv,∀v ∈ V ,∀p˜ ∈ P
wb ≥ 0,∀b ∈ B.
(6.28)
Problem (6.29) is equivalent to the tractable linear program:
min
w
∑
v∈V
∑
b∈B
∑
x∈X
dv,x,bp(x)wb
s.t.
∑
b∈B
∑
x∈X
dv,x,bp(x)wb −
∑
b
∑
x∈X
dv,x,bp
−(x)wb +
∑
x∈X
p−(x)yv −
∑
x∈X
zv,x ≥ tv,∀v ∈ V∑
b
dv,x,b(p
−(x) + p+(x))wb ≥ (p−(x) + p+(x))yv − zv,x, ∀v ∈ V ,∀x ∈ X
wb ≥ 0, zv,x ≥ 0, ∀b ∈ B,∀v ∈ V ,∀x ∈ X.
(6.29)
An adaptive robust optimization method is proposed by Chan et.al [23] to continu-
ously incorporate observed breathing motion PMF after treatment starts into current
uncertainty set and generate new uncertainty set.
6.3.4 Robust Mixed Integer Programming and Operating
Room Planning
Application: Operating Room Planning
Cost reduction has become more and more crucial for hospitals under the Affordable
Care Act. As one of the most expensive resources in the hospitals, operating rooms
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receive massive attention regarding their planning and scheduling to improve oper-
ation efficiency and optimize financial returns. We refer to [22] for a comprehensive
literature review of operating room planning and scheduling. Among all operating
room planning and scheduling problems, the Surgical Case Assignment Problem (S-
CAP) refers to the problem of assigning patients to a given set of operating room
(OR) blocks over the planning horizon. There are two major sources of uncertainties
existed in OR planning: emergency arrivals and surgery durations. We focus on OR
planning under uncertain surgery durations. Simulation, stochastic optimization,
and robust optimization can be utilized to address this type of uncertainty.
Addis et. al. [7] propose a robust mixed integer programming (MIP) model for
the SCAP with uncertain surgery duration, aiming to minimize a penalty function
associated with waiting time, urgency and tardiness of patients due to delay in serving
patients, without generating scenarios. The deterministic formulation of the problem
is:
min
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
∑
t∈Tj
([tui] + [(wi + t− li)+]ui)xtij+∑
i∈I
([wi + |T |+ 1]ui + [(wi + |T |+ 1− li)+]ui)(1−
∑
j∈J
∑
t∈Tj
xtij)
s.t.
∑
j∈J
∑
t∈Tj
xtij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I∑
i∈I
six
t
ij ≤ cj + otj ∀j ∈ J,∀t ∈ Tj
otj ≤ δvtj ∀j ∈ J,∀t ∈ Tj∑
j∈J
∑
t∈Ti
vtj ≤ ∆
xtij ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ J,∀t ∈ Tj
(6.30)
where decision variable xtij is a binary variable that equals to 1 if patient i is assigned
to block j in time t ∈ Tj. To address the uncertain surgery duration si, an uncertainty
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set which consists of intervals [s¯i− sˆi, s¯i+ sˆi] is constructed by setting s¯i to the mean
of the distribution of si, and sˆi to the standard deviation of the distribution of si.
A budget of uncertainty constraint is also incorporated. The robust counterpart of
Problem (6.30) is formulated by replacing the constraint
∑
i∈I
six
t
ij ≤ cj + otj with the
following constraints:
∑
i∈I
s¯ix
t
ij + Γp
jt +
∑
i∈I
qjti ≤ cj + otj, ∀j ∈ J,∀t ∈ Tj
pjt + qjti ≥ sˆixtij, ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ J
pjt, qjti ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ J,∀t ∈ Tj
(6.31)
where Γ is the budget of uncertainty parameter which is the maximum number of
patients with surgery duration reaching the upper bound of nominal duration. The
optimal solution of the robust problem is obtained by applying the approach in
Bertsimas and Sim [15]. Their experiments demonstrate a reduction in the number
of surgery cancelation compared to the deterministic model. Also, by properly tuning
the value of Γ, a reasonable trade-off between utilization rate and quality of service
can be achieved.
Denton et. al. [33] consider the situation of multiple ORs under certainty. Two
decisions are made by the models: how many ORs to open on a given day, and
allocation of surgeries to ORs. They first propose a two-stage stochastic linear pro-
gram with binary decisions in the first stage and simple recourse in the second stage.
Followed by the stochastic programming problem is its robust counterpart, in which
the objective is to minimize the maximum total fixed and variable costs associated
with an uncertainty set for surgery durations. The robust counterpart is reformu-
lated as a mixed integer (linear) program, and the numerical results show that it is
a fast and effective heuristic for computing near-optimal solutions to the stochastic
recourse problem. Since they also incorporate the budget of uncertainty constraint
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in the robust problem, a sensitivity analysis is performed with respect to the choice
of Γ, which is the maximum number of surgery blocks that reach their upper bounds.
Intuitively, as Γ increases, more ORs tend to be opened since more surgeries reach
their upper bounds in the worst case. It is illustrated by the experiments that for
the 15-surgery block instances, the solution quality reaches its peak when Γ is in the
range of 2-4.
6.3.5 Conclusions
Decision makers in the healthcare systems need to make informed decisions with
imperfect information on a daily basis. As an approach to address uncertainty, robust
optimization has been utilized in a variety of applications in healthcare systems
engineering. In this chapter, we provide an overview of the healthcare systems,
including payment systems and delivery systems in the United States. We survey
applications of robust optimization, particularly in prediction of healthcare costs,
disease management, IMRT fluence map optimization, and operating room planning,
among others. Further, we propose a robust Markov Decision Processes model for
the problem of disease management.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this dissertation, we have addressed several problems of current healthcare fi-
nancing systems in the United States. In chapter 2, we proposed a highly tractable
approach to incorporate parameter uncertainty into calculation of risk scores and
money transfers in the commercial risk adjustment program. The worst-regret is
minimized to ensure more fair payments to health insurers under parameter esti-
mation errors. The problem is solved via linear programming and empirical results
show small changes in robust risk scores but large fluctuations in money transfers
between insurers. In chapter 3, we investigated major attributes of plan premiums,
and the regression results suggest that “company” is the most important attribute.
We proposed a simple algorithm to identify inefficient plans and assigned three grade
letters to health insurers in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. We also have made
recommendations on how much the “dominated” should decrease their premiums
in order to be efficient in our framework. Both chapter 4 and chapter 5 analyze
issues related to Medicare, where chapter 4 identifies main factors driving Medicare
beneficiaries’ choices of prescription drug plans between MAPD and PDP. Since the
characteristics of these two groups of people are quite different, recommendation-
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s are made to help policy makers better promoting their Part D plans. Similarly,
chapter 5 analyzes the trends in Medicare services usage and reimbursement rate
for all states. The correlation analysis disagrees with the concern that physicians
tend to upcode on purpose. We turned our attention back to robust optimization
in chapter 6, where we surveyed applications of robust regression, robust Markov
Decision Processes, robust linear programming and robust mixed integer program-
ming in healthcare systems engineering. We also proposed a robust MDP model for
disease management problem where a nurse tracks medication adherence of a patient
recovering from acute care.
There remain some areas of interest to us for future work. First, a large number
of previously uninsured nonelderly people entered the system due to the Affordable
Care Act of 2010. Incorporating learning in the risk adjustment models is needed,
since more information will become available over time for the newly insured when
they submit claims. In addition, application of analytics is increasingly prevalent
in the healthcare industry. There is a demand of developing more analytical mod-
els particularly for problems in healthcare financing systems. With the aid of the
highly quantitative and analytical tools, policy makers can make more dynamic and
high-quality decisions that will most benefit the community they serve. In addi-
tion, because of the uncertain environment of healthcare systems, it is possible to
extend applications of robust optimization to other problems in healthcare systems
engineering, if suitable.
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